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In this study, the Marketing in a New Era (MINE) grain marketing simulation game 
is used to carry out a context-rich economic experiment to evaluate the role of risk 
preferences in grain marketing decisions.  The model of risk preferences that we consider 
is an improved Safety First decision rule model proposed by Levy and Levy (2009).  We 
experimentally test if Safety First decision rule describes individuals’ post-harvest 
marketing decisions.  In our experiment, we incorporate real-world features which are 
usually omitted in marketing studies such as: multiple storage decisions, storage cost, 
actual price series and multiple contract frequency.  MINE plays a critical role by allowing 
us to observe participant’s intra-season hedging decisions.  Our results indicate that Safety 
First matters in post-harvest marketing decisions.  Specifically, individuals with strong 
Safety First preferences sell significantly more grain at the spot market right after harvest 
compared to individuals without strong Safety First preferences.  This research may be of 
interest to those working on marketing advisory services, in developing guidelines for 
optimal marketing strategies that apart from market and farm characteristics should 
consider personal characteristics as well.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
A UNIQUE MARKETING EDUCATIONAL TOOL:  
MARKETING IN A NEW ERA SIMULATION GAME  
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1. Introduction 
 
Every year many extension meetings across the U.S. focus on grain marketing risk 
management.  Grain marketing represents an important challenge that producers face since 
the commodity price received directly impacts revenue and therefore profit.  Producers 
face the threat of weak farm income and possible farm failure due to production and 
commodity price risk, reminding them that room for mistakes is limited (Musser, Patrick 
and Eckman, 1996).  To improve commodity price risk, grain marketing education is 
needed.  However, in an educational setting it is quite challenging to make economic 
concepts interesting and rigorous enough for audiences to leave with improved skills.  One 
reason for this is that audiences are often not presented with learning activities allowing 
them to test and improve their skills in any meaningful way.  Improvements in technology 
have allowed for improvements in the interaction between extension audiences and 
presenter through experiential learning.  Simulation-based learning is one type of 
experiential learning that can be used to develop specific skills (Lean, Moizer, Towler and 
Abbey, 2006).  In grain marketing, simulations are training devices used to increase 
producers’ understanding of commodity markets and of how to manage commodity price 
risk in an educational setting. 
As with any instructional method, simulation games contain both advantages and 
disadvantages.  The primary advantage with a simulation game is that it addresses some of 
the limitations of the traditional teaching-and-learning paradigm (Ruben, 1999).  In 
general, experiential teaching methods are interactive, encourage peer collaboration and 
facilitate active learning (Ruben, 1999).  A survey by O’ Rourke (2001) reported 
disadvantages related to simulations to be: the cost of updating and maintaining the 
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software, the lack of participants’ adequate background, the time competition with other 
learning activities, and the difficulty to evaluate participants’ performance.  This chapter 
puts forward a grain marketing simulation game called Marketing in a New Era (hereafter 
MINE) that effectively addresses these drawbacks while being adaptable for a wide variety 
of audiences.  The uniqueness of this grain marketing simulation game is that participants 
can create a realistic production setting (i.e., contains realistic yields, costs, etc.) and 
experience the marketing environment (based on historical prices) in a short time using 
common marketing tools (i.e., cash contracts, futures contracts etc.).  Also, participants are 
able to review marketing results and ask questions all during the extension meeting, as well 
as keep exercising their marketing skills after the meeting through the on-line application 
of MINE.  This set up allows for multiple simulation games to be played, resulting in a 
greatly enhanced learning experience.  It is important to underline that the simulation 
allows each participant to operate at his/her own level and learn at his/her own pace.  This 
function makes the game suitable for a variety of audiences.  Furthermore, the ability for 
participants to be able to use values that are similar to the costs of their own farm, helps 
them conceptualize the game as an actual grain marketing environment.  The utilization of 
common marketing tools and historical price series provides a realistic environment which 
is necessary to attract audience’s attention.  Immediate feedback is a desirable component 
that other grain marketing simulations played over a long period don’t provide (Popp and 
Keisling, 2001).  Finally, the on-line access to the game allows for unlimited self-paced 
repetitions of games with various historical price-series.  
Agricultural markets are complex.  At the beginning of the year, producers are faced 
with complexity stemming from unknown futures markets prices, basis, production costs 
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and production.  Futures markets embody a large amount of information stemming from 
global supply and demand expectations while operating using specific rules for the 
particular commodity.  Basis represents factors faced by local grain buyers that are passed 
on to producers.  While futures and basis prices fluctuate, producers must also manage their 
own production expectations.  Production costs represent all of the costs incurred to 
produce the commodity.  Production represents the amount of grain produced given the 
particular set of weather conditions.  While these factors appear independent they may not 
be.  For example, in a pre-harvest environment (pricing grain in advance of production) 
forward contracting grain brings in yield risk because that grain must be delivered when 
the contract expires.  This is especially true if the price-yield correlation is positive.   
Producers use futures and basis contracts to hedge the possibility of prices moving 
against them, or lower.  Hedging implies that at some point in the future, the futures 
contracts will be offset with sales of the physical commodity.  Many times, hedging is 
oversimplified in the sense that is illustrated as a pure risk-avoidance tool only (Cramer 
and Wailes, 1993).  MINE uses the pure risk-avoidance hedging as a departure point from 
which it is easier to introduce other types of hedging, as storage hedging and “pre-harvest” 
hedging as well as the returns to hedging. 
The simulation game presented here demonstrates marketing in a way that is 
appropriate for producer grain marketing extension meetings, courses related to Economics 
of Futures Markets and also tradeshows such as “Husker Harvest days”.  The rest of the 
chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we compare and contrast previous simulations 
in Agricultural Economics and explain why a new grain marketing simulation is necessary. 
In Section 3, we describe how the principles of grain marketing are introduced in an 
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interactive way to several audiences.  In the final section, we summarize the evaluations of 
the first introduction of the game in extension meetings in Nebraska. 
 
2. Simulation games in Agricultural Economics 
 
Simulations in agricultural courses have been a common tool over the last decades. 
(Stewart et al., 2000).  The substantial difference of the games/simulations comparing with 
other conventional methods such as lectures or seminars is that through the game the 
participants control or experience various events and/or responses (Stewart et al., 2000). 
Also, they may convey economic information in a more effective and lasting way (Fels, 
1993; Gremmen and Potters, 1997).  By taking over the decision-making responsibility, 
participants become more active, leading to more motivation.  However, the greatest 
significance of incorporating games/simulations in the educational process lies on the 
increasing awareness and understanding of principles, interactions and methods of analysis 
(Stewart et al., 2000).  
Many universities had developed simulations for agricultural economics and 
agribusiness management courses.  O’Rourke (2001) lists approximately 65 simulations 
and computer programs that are used in education.  14 out of 65 were used in courses 
related to agribusiness, futures and options, economics of futures markets, and risk 
management.  However, as O’Rourke (2001) explains, there are no details identified for 
these games and no single simulation has dominated in agricultural economics programs.  
Thus, it is difficult to assess their efficacy in terms of improvement students’ motivation, 
grade of realism, improvement of decision-making skills, risk management and, 
communication skills. 
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Some examples of grain marketing simulations that have been used in producer 
meetings are the “Winning the Game” and the “Commodity Challenge” from the 
University of Minnesota, and the paper based “Soybean Marketing Challenge” (Prop and 
Keisling, 2001) from the University of Arkansas.  All three games teach producers how to 
market grain in a profitable way.  The “Marketing Challenge” is an on-line game with an 
advanced set up that includes forward contracts and options.  Even though it is useful for 
participants who want to monitor grain marketing using currently offered prices over a long 
period of time, the process of learning is relatively slow because its results are based on 
daily futures prices and it requires from the user to revisit the game many times in order to 
receive sufficient feedback.  The “Winning the Game” as well as the “Soybean Marketing 
Challenge” are designed for half-day meetings and extension meetings.  The main 
drawback of these games is that they don’t give the ability to participants to play on-line 
and individually.  Therefore, the number of repetitions is limited and the accessibility of 
the game is harder. 
 
3. Uniqueness of Marketing in a New Era Simulation Game 
 
MINE is a computer based simulation program created by the Department of 
Agricultural Economics at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (UNL) aimed at improving 
producer marketing knowledge and abilities.  MINE focuses on the marketing decision 
process using historical prices which are normalized to represent user entered current price 
levels.  The ability to normalize historical price series to current price levels improves both 
the effectiveness and the efficiency of MINE.  It is effective because the results are realistic 
since they are based upon previously experienced historical price series.  It is efficient 
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because producers can experience different past market conditions using current price 
levels. 
MINE is designed according to educational objectives and learning theory.  Boehlje 
and Eidman (1978) propose that simulations in management courses contribute to the 
following three educational objectives: (1) Transfer of facts and economic principles.  After 
the introduction of the principles, MINE allows participants to apply the concept of grain 
marketing, experience the process with actual historical prices, observe the results and 
reflect on those.  The fact that the values of the game (prices, costs, interest rates) are 
lifelike, reinforces the understanding of the grain marketing concept, and makes the 
outcome believable.  (2) Simulations increase analytical capabilities.  MINE is designed in 
a way that gives the instructor the opportunity to identify the problem, to emphasize in the 
economic concept behind grain marketing and to the logical reasoning that will lead to a 
solution of the problem.  The identification of the decision-making problem is hard to be 
taught in a static setting, MINE game serves this need by directly demonstrating the impact 
of sequential decisions in a dynamic environment.  (3) Simulations enhance the ability of 
integrating facts and methods of analysis and enable users to make more informed 
decisions.  MINE facilitates the integration of grain marketing theory with different 
methods of analysis for the pre-harvest marketing and the post-harvest marketing. 
  
4. Methodology and Applications. 
 
MINE approaches grain marketing as two distinct periods, pre-harvest and post-
harvest.  For the grain marketer, this is a logical break because risks and important market 
information change between these two periods.  Pre-harvest marketing allows for yield risk 
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whereas in post-harvest, the production cycle is complete, and therefore yield is known.  In 
post-harvest, the marketer focuses on price, carry and basis whereas in pre-harvest, harvest 
price and basis is the focus along with the crop insurance contract.  This division in the 
marketing cycle makes the simulation more flexible, allowing participants to focus on what 
they are interested in.  For example, if the producer feels more comfortable with post-
harvest marketing they may choose to improve that type of marketing.  Alternatively, they 
may desire to learn more about how pre-harvest marketing operates.  Also, this distinction 
makes more salient the different marketing strategies that are followed in each case.   
In the following discussion, we will evaluate pre- and post-harvest marketing 
periods independently.  We will first discuss components of MINE which are similar 
between both periods.  MINE provides a realistic trading experience by allowing the user 
flexibility in farm parameters.  Parameters which can be modified are: crop, crop acres, 
expected yield (or yield in post-harvest), current price, bushels in storage, costs associated 
with production (pre-harvest) or storage (post-harvest), crop insurance (pre-harvest), 
marketing periods, and financial ratio calculator (pre-harvest).  Crop selection identifies 
the crop being sold during the trading simulation, allowing the user to market specific crops 
independently, partially based upon their knowledge of the crop and the instructor to 
underline the specific characteristics of each grain regarding the marketing process.  For 
example, soybeans are deemed as a relatively low-margin crop, which means that grain 
marketing can determine whether the production will be profitable or not. (Popp and 
Keisling, 2001).  This allows MINE to be more realistic because it is using information on 
how these commodities operate (for example, using real world soybean futures in soybean 
marketing simulation).  Crop acres identifies the number of acres planted to a crop.  The 
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ability to modify crop acres allows the user to represent crop acres in their local area.  Crop 
acres interacts with the number of marketable bushels, actual farm yield which interacts 
with the crop insurance policy, and production cost.  Expected yield represents the per acre 
yield expected to be harvested pre-harvest.  Expected yield interacts with crop acres to 
identify the total expected production and crop insurance to identify per acre guarantees.  
In post-harvest, yield is the amount of bushels which were harvested.  Current price 
represents the current cash price, allowing the simulation game to be based on prices users 
are seeing today.  Bushels in storage indicates the number of bushels the producer has 
available to market during a post-harvest simulation.  Costs are broken down into both pre-
harvest, which represents commodity production costs and post-harvest which represents 
storage costs.1  Administrators can enter production costs based upon the region, which 
improves simulation accuracy with local conditions.  Marketing periods identifies the 
number of times the user can make marketing decisions.  The minimum is three periods 
and the maximum is twelve.  Variation in the number of marketing periods provides users 
flexibility to meet their objectives.  If the user wishes to experience many scenarios then 
they may select fewer marketing periods.  If the user wishes to spend more time in a 
scenario analyzing the markets then they will select more marketing periods.  So, the game 
is adjusted on the audience’s needs in order to succeed the highest effectiveness combined 
with the lowest possible fatigue.  In addition, the duration of the game purposely is flexible 
to fit with any previous learning activities of a meeting.   
Finally, one of the most important and innovative components in both pre-harvest 
and post-harvest options is the fact that the prices which the participant faces come from 
                                                            
1 There is a break-even price in the post-harvest simulation representing per bushel production costs. 
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previously experienced historical price series, started from 1990.  That is, the prices of each 
marketing year are stored in MINE.  The instructor selects a marketing year and creates the 
price scenario that will be used in the upcoming simulation.  Because of the long-term 
trends that have occurred between 1990 and now, prices series are normalized and adjusted 
to the current nominal prices.  Participants do not receive any information about the prices 
before the completion of the game.  When the game is over, producers justify how they 
priced their grain and the instructor leads a group discussion following each simulation. 
The discussion allows users to better understand which strategies worked best under the 
specified conditions. 
Pre-Harvest Marketing 
The goal of MINE pre-harvest marketing is to evaluate the relation between 
profitability from forward contracting before and during the growing season and risk of 
producing a crop.  In order producers to have a reasonable return from the pre-harvest 
marketing, knowledge of basis’s behavior and knowledge of the relationship between local 
cash price and futures price in the delivery month is required. (Cramer and Wailes, 1993). 
The MINE’s Pre-Harvest Marketing aims to demonstrate to participants how to cope with 
yield risk along with price risk by forward pricing part of the expected grain during the 
growing season.  Producer selects from a variety of insurance contracts associated with 
insurance type (yield or revenue) and coverage levels (50 to 85% in 5% increments).  The 
inclusion of crop insurance in the simulation provides a realistic situation in today’s pre-
harvest grain marketing environment.   
Another feature of the pre-harvest marketing simulation is the financial ratio 
calculator.  The intention of the financial ratio calculator is to identify changes in important 
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financial ratios stemming from marketing decisions.  The financial ratios used in MINE 
are important to bankers because they help decide if capital will be provided to producers 
or not.  Producers influence financial ratios through outcomes from the grain marketing 
simulation game.  Four financial ratios are considered in the module and each is determined 
by farm financial return.  The Current Ratio is a liquidity ratio that indicates whether a farm 
is able to pay its liabilities with assets. 2  It carries important information because the higher 
the ratio the larger the proportion of assets compared to the value of liabilities.  The Net 
Farm Income Ratio, is a significant efficiency ratio because it indicates the proportion of 
production that remained as net income in the farm (FBP Module 8, 2004). 3  The Term 
Debt Coverage Ratio is an indicator of the ability of the producer to cover the term debt.4  
Finally, the Operation Profit Margin Ratio is a profitability ratio that shows how efficiently 
the farm converts production into returns (FBP Module 8, 2004). 5  Each financial ratio 
requires starting values, which are obtained by Nebraska Farm Business Inc. (NFBI).  
NFBI collects financial data from producers who are part of the NFBI program.  NFBI 
financial data is broken into four regions in NE: [North East, South East, South Central and 
Western].  Users select their region from a map of Nebraska.   
As with the post-harvest version of MINE, pre-harvest games use actual historical 
price series in the simulation as well as predetermined yield.6  Participants have the 
                                                            
2 Current Ratio= 
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 
3 Net Farm Income Ratio= 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
4 Term Debt Coverage 
Ratio=
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒−𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒+𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒−𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥+𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔−𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔−𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠
 
5 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒+𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒−𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
6 The instructor sets the final yield based on the chosen price series.  If the price series is 2012 corn then the 
final yield would be lower than the expected yield to reflect the drought. 
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opportunity to forward price expected production during different milestones (figure 1). 
Depending upon the actual number of bushels harvested (at the end of the game) there may 
be an insurance claim.  Participants have the option to purchase a crop insurance contract 
at the beginning of the game.  This structure facilitates the discussion about the importance 
of crop insurance and the type of crop insurance contract (yield or revenue).  Cases where 
producers have decided to not buy insurance at the beginning of the game and they ended 
up with negative profits due to low production are good examples of how experiential 
learning works.  Producer experiences are challenged through what they learn from MINE. 
This intersection results in an update of thought, and modification of the existed 
knowledge, (Percy, 2005) recognition of ignorance, re-thinking etc. “aiming to establish 
renewed contact with something original” (Malinen, 2000). 
 
Feedback from Pre-Harvest Marketing 
Right-after the completion of the pre-harvest game participants review their 
personal decisions and the corresponding profit or loss.  The pre-harvest group review 
ranks participants marketing from the most profitable to the most unfavorable, taking into 
consideration the insurance selected and the costs.  The instructor along with the audience 
goes through the results of the entire group.  Ideally, all participants will share with the 
audience what were the factors that drove their decisions.  Peer learning allows individuals 
to re-shape their perceptions and to learn about the diversity in approaches.   
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Post-Harvest Marketing 
The goal of MINE’s Post-harvest marketing is to underline the interaction between 
profitability and risk associated with storage decisions.  For this reason, it allows 
participant to create a marketing strategy using a combination of cash, futures and basis 
contracts (Figures 2, 3 and 4).  MINE aims to teach producers how to make decisions based 
on economics and market signals.  For this reason, it analytically displays the calculations 
behind the expected cash under any given price.  Although future contracts are not used for 
actual purchase or sale of grain, they serve as temporary substitutes for intended later 
transactions in cash.  MINE demonstrates how hedgers who have spot market position 
should use futures contracts as risk management tool.  Basis and futures are marketing 
components that are directly connected with such decisions, and producers should take into 
consideration how these components behave.  Changes in futures price reflect changes in 
expectations regarding future supply and demand conditions.  Also, changes between two 
futures prices (carry) reflects a change in demand and supply conditions across delivery 
months.  A highly positive carry encourages producers to store the grain and earn the cost 
of carry through hedging (Cramer and Wailes, 1993).  Producers should be able to 
recognize these signals and adjust their marketing plan.  
Despite the fact that basis risk is lower than price risk as we go towards the 
expiration of the futures contract, transportation costs and local supply and demand issues 
can generate large differences in basis even in locations that are not too far.  For example, 
plentiful local supply results in a large negative basis while shortage in local market results 
in a smaller negative or even positive basis.  Generally, basis is more meaningful for grain 
trade than as an absolute price.  To a grain merchant a basis of 10 cents under, carries more 
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information than a quoted price of $3.5.  That happens because basis is an indicator for 
how expensive is the cash grain relative to futures.  Also, hedgers that have opposite 
positions in futures and cash markets are more interested in basis changes than in price 
itself because basis will determine their revenue.  
Feedback from Post-Harvest Marketing 
The purpose of the feedback is to help people learn about their approach towards 
price risk given that particular year’s price movement.  They also discover diverse 
approaches to grain marketing (Stewart et al., 2000).  The feedback at the end of the game 
is provided to participants in order to have both demonstrated and witnessed that even 
though all face the same market conditions and farm characteristics, the results range from 
the loss of capital to large profits.  This helps the coordinator of the workshop to lead a 
discussion on issues that further the learning opportunities (Stewart et al., 2000).  More 
specifically, MINE provides immediate feedback for each participant separately as well as 
for the group.  Firstly, producers individually review their decisions throughout the game 
and their performance in terms of net revenue (figure 5).  Secondly, they receive feedback 
related to if they would have sold every bushel at harvest (figure 6).  A positive difference 
shows how much of the revenue would be forgone with no post-harvest grain marketing. 
This difference appears as percentage of the net revenue at harvest, and a monetary 
difference.  Moreover, this summary screen (figure 6) provides detailed analysis about the 
impact of each marketing component (basis, futures, and cash) on the net revenue.   
Regarding the collective results, during the game players’ decisions are stored in 
instructor’s computer, where the results from the entire group are compiled.  At the end of 
the game the instructor shows several graphs.  Firstly, a graph (figure 7) summarizing the 
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results of the group ranked in descending order is shared with the audience.  Participants 
along with the instructor, go through the results and they review the strategies that they 
were followed.  Additionally, users compare their marketing outcome with a number of 
different benchmarks.  The first comparison is related to the maximum possible revenue. 
That is, the revenue that the producer could hypothetically achieve if she had sold the entire 
amount of grain in the highest price of the year.  The second comparison shows how many 
participants were better off after using grain marketing and how many were worse off. 
Secondly, the instructor displays a series of two more detailed graphs that show to 
what extent the decisions of the participants were consistent with grain marketing theory.  
Figure 8, identifies the range of bushels sold by each participant, the average amount sold 
and the cash price for each milestone.  The teaching point is the discussion on the relation 
between bushels at each milestone and cash price.  Figure 9 describes the number of bushels 
contracted for future delivery for each participant and the futures carry.  The value of 
futures carry reflects the difference in a differed futures contract and the nearby contract.  
When positive, the differed contract is a higher price than the nearby, implying more 
revenue in the future.  Of course, the participant must deduct the storage cost to identify if 
the benefit is greater than the cost.  The discussion point is that participants are expected 
to take advantage of the futures carry if the value is greater than the expense of holding the 
grain to that point in the future. 
At the end of each Extension Meeting or other short of workshop, after covering 
both pre- harvest and post- harvest games, the instructor informs participants of the on-line 
MINE edition and encourages them to keep practicing on how to make marketing 
decisions.  The MINE on-line version provides the opportunity to participants to play 
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individually.7  The on-line version allows participants to parameterize the simulation in a 
way that depicts exactly the conditions of their own farm.  Moreover, even if in extension 
meetings and workshops each player works with her own pace, there is an objective time 
constraint.  On-line version allows for unlimited repetitions of the price scenarios that are 
available without any time or other constraint.  In this case, the individual receives 
feedback related to her current performance, to her past performance in the same game as 
well as to the performance of all other participants that have played this game before.  Thus, 
the individual can evaluate her effort and also assess her progress from game to game. 
In addition, the on-line version provides MINE unlimited equipment capacity.  
Instructors usually use the mobile MINE lab which has a limited number of laptops 
available for participants.  However, if the participation is high, participants can use their 
laptops and connect with MINE through internet.  
 
5. MINE Accomplishments  
 
Between November 2015 and March 2017, there were 33 Nebraska Extension 
MINE Grain Marketing workshops across Nebraska for a total of 426 participants have 
played it.  At the completion of each workshop and 6 months following the workshop 
participants evaluated their knowledge and behavior change as a result for attending a 
Nebraska Extension Grain Marketing workshop.  Eighty-seven percent of the participants 
had never written a grain marketing plan before the workshop.  Following the workshop 
92% indicated they were planning to write a gran marketing plan.  One of the purposes of 
the workshop was to increase grain marketing plan implementation.  In the 6-month follow 
                                                            
7 On-line MINE is accessible even for individuals that have not attended a grain marketing meeting before.  
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up survey 40% of respondents indicated they had implemented a marketing plan for at least 
one commodity.  An additional object of these workshops was to increase and sustain 
participant’s knowledge of price patterns, basis and carrying charges.  To measure 
knowledge change, participants rated their knowledge of each of these topics on a scale 
from 1 to 7 prior to the workshop, and after the workshop, then again on the 6-month follow 
up survey.  On average, participants increased their knowledge of each subject, 0.8224 
points from their pre-workshop levels to their post-workshop levels.  On average, 6-months 
following the workshop participants rated their knowledge as high as or higher than the 
post-workshop results. 
MINE played a critical role in the learning experience for participants. 42% of 
participants rated MINE as “Effective or Very Effective” in improving their understanding 
of grain marketing. 22% of participants rated MINE as “Effective or Very Effective” in 
improving their grain marketing skills.  
Here are a few comments participants made regarding MINE.  
“All Extension Educators did a great job at educating the classroom with real-life 
scenarios that should be considered everyday on the farm. It was easy to relate to the 
information and understand how the online application could be a powerful tool.”  
“Having the chance to actually do the computer marketing program and then able 
to compare our marketing plans using different selling times…” 
“Nice combo of lecture and hands on.” 
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6. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, we introduced and motivated the use a grain marketing simulation 
called Marketing in a new Era (MINE) as an alternative instructional tool for classes and/or 
workshops related to grain marketing.  MINE’s strength is the ability for producers to 
participate in multiple marketing periods and receive feedback during the seminar.  MINE 
is separated into two distinct marketing periods pre-harvest marketing and post-harvest 
marketing.  The ability for MINE to operate in pre- and post-harvest periods allows the 
instructor to explain thoroughly the different marketing strategies that apply in each period. 
Also, gives participants the opportunity to experience these strategies and improve their 
marketing skills.  Emotions among the players range from satisfaction and excitement to 
even frustration.  In any case the goal of the Extension program has been achieved. 
Producers have been exposed in the key elements of grain marketing and they have 
obtained the right mindset.  Additionally, the chapter provides an overview of the impact 
of MINE in Nebraska Extension Meetings since its first introduction in 2015.  
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7. Figures 
 
Figure 1: Pre-Harvest Marketing Screen 
 
 
Figure 2: Post-Harvest Price Table. Participants can create cash, futures and basis 
contracts 
 
20 
 
Figure 3: Post-Harvest Futures Market Analysis. This table shows the economic 
determinants that should drive producers’ decisions. 
 
Figure 4: Simplified introductory version of the Post-Harvest Price Table for less 
experienced audiences, where participants create only cash contracts. 
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Figure 5: Individual Revenue Summary 
 
Figure 6: Comparison of net revenue with and without grain marketing 
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Figure 7: Group Review. Participants’ performance is ranked in descending order 
 
Figure 8: Total Amount of transactions per month compared to the respective cash price. 
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Figure 9: Total contracted amount in bushels per month compared with the futures carry. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE ROLE OF SAFETY FIRST PREFERENCES IN GRAIN MARKETING 
DECISION MAKING:  
EVIDENCE FROM A CONTEXT RICH ECONOMIC EXPERIMENT 
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1. Introduction 
 
Improving our understanding of the influence of risk preferences on decision 
making represents an important goal for economists.  This problem is especially true when 
it comes to the marketing of grain.  A primary barrier comes from the difficulty of 
identifying linkages between the grain marketing decision process and economic 
principles. (Kastens and Dhuyvetter, 1999).  Grain marketing research has primarily 
focused on the use of different marketing techniques that result in lower price risk and, 
therefore, lower income risk (Musser, Patrick, Eckman, 1996).  However, the extent to 
which these theoretical findings are relevant to real world applications is not clear (Brorsen 
and Irwin,1996; Garcia and Leuthold, 2004).  While reducing income risk is desired it 
ignores the influence of producer risk preferences when marketing grain.  A potential 
reason for these research limitations appears to be the lack of data on producers’ grain 
marketing decision behavior (Tomek and Peterson, 2001), as well as on producers’ risk 
preferences.  However, it is important to understand how producers make decisions in order 
to provide better marketing advisory services and in order to reduce the divergence between 
the theoretical and empirical findings on grain marketing.  As Kastens and Dhuyvetter 
(1999) suggested, for producers to incorporate the proposed methods in marketing 
decisions and trust research results, it is important to use less aggregated, more 
comprehensive and simpler empirical processes.  In this chapter, we build an economic 
experiment to evaluate the role of producer risk preferences (in particular, we focus on 
Safety First risk preferences) on grain marketing decision behavior. 
Economic experiments are suitable for this research since they allow the controlled 
testing of human behavior in a wide variety of context neutral and context-rich settings 
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through systematic variation in one or more variables of interest without the possibility of 
confounding.  Additionally, the economic experiment in this study resolves the limitation 
of lack of data in grain marketing decisions at an individual level. 
We conduct a context-rich lab experiment to explore the relation between 
individuals’ risk preferences and post-harvest grain marketing decision-making.  Our 
experiment has three stages.  In the first stage, we use the context-free risk elicitation tasks 
developed by Levy and Levy (2009) to evaluate whether Safety First (SF) risk preferences 
are present.  The results of the first stage allow us to directly elicit subjects’ SF risk 
preferences.  Also, the results from Stage 1 allow us to verify if the lab measure proposed 
by Levy and Levy (2009) could predict real world farming behavior (Hellerstein, Higgings, 
Horowitz, 2012). 
The second stage of the experiment involves a computer simulation game, called 
Marketing in a New Era (MINE).8  In this stage, subjects make multiple post-harvest grain 
marketing decisions by creating contracts for spot or future grain delivery under four 
different grain price scenarios.  In making these decisions participants face price 
uncertainty only since production is known under all scenarios.  Also, participants incur a 
production cost that is fixed and a storage cost that varies according to their marketing 
decisions.  Finally, after the completion of stage 2, a socio-demographic survey follows. 
The conclusions of this study are based on the combination of participants’ grain marketing 
decisions with their risk preferences and their socio-demographic characteristics. 
To the best of our knowledge this is the first study that experimentally tests the 
impact of risk preferences on grain marketing decisions.  Also, it is one of the first studies 
                                                            
8 A detailed description of MINE game is provided in Chapter 1. In this chapter, the features of the game 
will be briefly discussed when it is necessary. 
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that incorporates the dynamic characteristic of storage cost as it appears in real world.  The 
majority of grain marketing studies do not have the ability to evaluate the intra-season 
hedging decision.  Especially for post-harvest marketing, grain storage is conceptually 
considered as an all-or-none decision (Kastens and Dhuyvetter, 1999), although many 
studies have shown that producers market their crops with greater frequency than once 
during the marketing year (e.g. Goodwin and Kastens, 1996; Katchova and Miranda, 2004).  
However, as Kastens and Dhuyvetter (1999) indicate, studies that explicitly consider 
storage costs under alternative marketing strategies may be more useful for producers. 
The primary objective of this study is to identify how risk preferences affect grain 
marketing behavior.  Our literature review indicates that until 2015 there has not been a 
study that experimentally examines producers’ behavior and output price (Lee, Bellemare 
and Just 2017).  Moreover, as Ruhinduka et al (2017) state, studies that have investigated 
behavioral attributes (risk preferences, time preferences etc.) have mainly focused on pre-
harvest decisions.  Additionally, behavior in the grain marketing simulation game can be 
used to address important economic questions which might exert considerable cognitive 
load on the decision-making agent.  In that sense results of this study could demonstrate 
the role of simulation games in providing opportunity for hands on experiential learning at 
the individual level. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2, describes grain markets 
and explains the role of risk preferences in grain marketing decisions.  Also, Section 2 
presents previous studies related to risk preferences and grain marketing as well as 
literature related to simulation games and experimental economics.  Section 3 reproduces 
Levy and Levy decision-making theory, Section 4 describes the experimental design, 
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Section 5 presents the summary statistics and the econometric results, Section 6 discusses 
the conclusions and Section 7 provides directions for further research. 
 
2. Literature Review  
2.1. Grain Marketing Environment 
Grain marketing represents a critical step for producers because it transforms 
production into dollars that are then used to pay bills.  The economic health and financial 
sustainability of many farms and rural communities relies on the efficiency of grain 
industry (Cramer and Wailes, 1993).  Therefore, the grain pricing system, among its other 
functions, determines the acres of production as well as the farm income (Cramer and 
Wailes, 1993).  For a greater understanding of the factors which influence grain marketing 
decisions, it is essential to understand how grain markets work. 
In grain trade, agreements between buyers and sellers occur through a variety of 
contracts.  A sales contract is “an agreement between two parties to exchange commodity 
for money or for another commodity” (Cramer and Wailes, 1993).  This agreement 
specifies the price, the quantity, and the time of delivery.9  Contracts can be created anytime 
throughout the production year, leaving no limit to the number of contracts that a producer 
can execute.  To simplify the producers’ complex marketing environment, contracts can be 
classified based on whether they occur before or after harvest, and whether the time of 
delivery is different from the time of contracting.  Contracts that take place before harvest 
are classified as “pre-harvest”.  Contracts that take place after harvest are classified as 
                                                            
9 Depending on the type of contract additional specifications may be required e.g. quality of grain, place of 
delivery etc. For detailed analysis of the different types of contracts refer to Cramer and Wailes 1993. 
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‘post-harvest’.  The primary difference between pre- and post-harvest marketing periods is 
that in pre-harvest there is yield risk additionally to price risk, since the production has not 
been determined yet.10 
In pre-harvest marketing decisions producers must take into account expected 
production and production costs.  Production risk matters when a positive price-yield 
correlation exists.  That is, not being able to deliver on contracted bushels could result in 
buying out of contracts at a higher price, which would be financially costly.  Post-harvest 
marketing decisions revolve around the prospect of positive returns to storage.  There are 
two primary ways to earn positive returns to storage.  First, which is the least risky, is to 
use the futures market carry, if one exists, and forward contract for delivery in the future.  
Second, which is the riskiest, is to leave grain unpriced in hopes of a futures market rally. 
Time of contract delivery is the other marketing classification.  Contracts that are 
written to be delivered upon immediately are classified as ‘spot delivery’ or cash contracts 
and those that are written to be delivered upon in the future are classified as ‘futures 
contracts’.  For spot delivery contracts, contracted grain is sold at the current spot price and 
delivered.  Logically, spot delivery contracts occur during the post-harvest marketing since 
grain must be on hand to deliver.  For futures contracts, grain is priced in advance of 
delivery.  For example, grain may be priced today for delivery in two months.  Futures 
contracts can be applied to either pre- or post-harvest marketing periods. 
While the functionality of grain marketing is relatively straight forward, 
implementation of a grain marketing strategy involves decision makers.  Decision makers 
                                                            
10 There is no specific day that pre-harvest marketing ends and post-harvest marketing begins.  A reasonable 
starting point for post-harvest marketing is when 50% of the crop is harvested, but depending on the producer, 
post-harvest marketing might start earlier or later than this threshold (Kastens and Dhyvetter, 1999).   
 
30 
 
who contain risk preferences.  Producers need to decide the amount of risk they are willing 
to accept, or stated in a different way, decide how much they are willing to pay for a safer 
income (Cramer and Wailes, 1993). 
 
2.2 Risk Preferences and Grain Marketing 
 
Decision making under risk has been investigated in a considerable amount of 
experimental literature in either laboratory or field setting (Menapace, Colson, and 
Raffaelli, 2012).  This topic is of interest because risk is involved in a broad spectrum of 
decisions that producers make on daily basis.  Hence, a better understanding of the 
relationship between risk and behavior observed in real world (field behavior) is important 
(Hellerstein, Higgings, Horowitz, 2012).  Several studies show that producers’ risk 
preferences influence many aspects of farming decisions such as crop-selection and 
rotation (Maynard, Harper, Hoffman, 1997), purchase of crop insurance (Sulewski, 
Gajewska, 2014; Niewuwoudt and Bullock 1985), and technology adoption (Liu, 2013; 
Chavas and Holt, 1996). 
In this sort of studies (e.g. technology adoption and risk preferences), the variable 
of interest (the final decision), is observable in national, county, and even in farm level.  
Thus, a direct evaluation of the behavior traits that are associated with a specific field 
behavior is possible.  In grain marketing, market data can be used to analyze market 
behavior since the contract volume, the prices and the bushels traded are recorded in daily 
basis.  However, this data cannot uncover the way producers’ approach their grain 
marketing decisions.  The reason why market data cannot uncover how producers approach 
grain marketing, is lack of access to data on some of the key variables of interest.  Such 
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variables are the number of contracts that the producer created, the amount of grain that 
she contracted each time, the price at which the grain was sold, and the producer’s risk 
attitude.  To address market data issues, researchers survey producers about their grain 
marketing strategies, their familiarity with futures markets, the percentage of grain that 
they trade through futures or other contracts, as well as their perceptions towards risk.  This 
way researchers obtain an overall idea about producers’ behavior. 
Musser, Patrick and Eckman (1996) surveyed 62 large scale Midwestern cash grain 
farmers and determined the effects of farm characteristics and risk attitude on pre-harvest 
marketing tools.  They found that large-scale farmers forward contract mostly with cash 
forward contracts.  Also, the level of forward pricing is lower than what other theoretical 
studies recommend.  Katchova and Miranda (2004) investigated how farm and personal 
characteristics affect the adoption of marketing contracts as well as the quantity, the 
frequency and the type of contact chosen.  Their main finding was that the personal and 
farm traits predominately affect the contract adoption decision rather than the quantity, 
frequency etc.  Also, they concluded that more specialized producers contract less 
production but more frequently.  Davis et al. (2005) analyzed the forward pricing behavior 
of corn and soybean producers through a random survey that was mailed to different states.  
They found that producers use forward pricing techniques before and after harvest and they 
tend to use the similar marketing approaches every year.  Additionally, they showed the 
limitations of the hypothesis that forward pricing decisions can be approached as 
technology adoption decision.  Sartwelle et al. (2000) surveyed producers from several 
states in order to study the personal and farm characteristics on grain marketing practices. 
They concluded that personal and business attributes affect the use of alternative cash, 
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forward and other types of contracts.  Goodwin and Kastens (1996) evaluated the 
marketing frequency of different crops (number of times per season that a crop is marketed) 
in Kansas.  Their results did not verify the assumption that risk perceptions are key 
determinants in grain marketing behavior, since producers’ risk attitudes had small effect 
on frequencies of marketing.  Shapiro and Brorsen (1988) conducted a survey about the 
factors that affected farmers’ hedging decisions and concluded that risk aversion is not a 
significant factor. 
Except from surveys, we found three studies that used artefactual field 
experiments” (Harrison and List, 2004) in order to examine marketing strategies with less 
aggregated data and producer-specific characteristics.11  Ruhinduka et al. (2017) 
experimentally elicited time and risk preferences in order to explain storage and processing 
decisions of Tanzanian Rice Farmers. 337 randomly selected households from different 
areas in Tanzania participated in a detailed survey about rice production and processing.  
In addition, producers took part in an experiment that elicited their risk, ambiguity and time 
preferences.  By linking the experimental parameters with field behavior researchers 
concluded that relatively risk neutral and patient individuals is more likely to store.  
Moreover, relatively risk neutral, young and educated individuals is more likely to process 
their grain.  Their experimental results showed that the methods used for time and risk 
preferences predicted the observed behavior in contrast with other studies where the 
predictive power was low. 
                                                            
11“In artefactual field experiments, researcher uses experimental subjects from the market of interest” (List, 
2008) who in this case are the producers and also, departs from the sterility of the laboratory environment 
(Harrison and List, 2004) and introduces the field context in the tasks (List, 2008), which in this case are 
grain marketing scenarios. 
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Lee, Bellemare and Just (2017) approached individuals’ pre-harvest grain 
marketing decisions with a context-rich economic experiment that they conducted with 
various samples.12  In their study, Lee, Bellemare and Just (2017) used experimental 
methodology to test how individuals that assume the role of a firm manager make their 
decisions about the production level of the firm under price risk compared to price 
certainty.  Risk preferences were elicited through the Holt-Laury (2002) multiple price 
lottery game.  The conclusion of the study was that under price risk, individuals decided to 
produce more than when price was known for certain.  Nevertheless, conditional on the 
existence of price risk, an increase in risk level led subjects to reduce their production 
levels.  Moreover, Mattos and Zinn (2016), ran a dynamic experiment to investigate how 
producers in Canada form and update their reference prices when they market their grain.  
They found that current market prices, price trends and producers’ own price expectations 
are the main determinants of the formation and the updating of reference prices. 
Finally, a study that does not link grain marketing decisions with individuals’ risk 
preferences but it shows the need for testing whether post-harvest marketing storage 
decisions are profitable is the one by Kastens and Dhuyvetter (1999).  Their research relied 
on a simulation of post-harvest marketing scenarios across different crops, futures and basis 
cash price forecasts, storage cost scenarios and locations in Kansas.  Based on the 
significance and consistency of the results, the authors failed to reject the hypothesis of 
cash market efficiency.  That is, there was no evidence that the calculation of expected 
                                                            
12 Contextualization is not typical experimental protocol (Ward et al., 2008) however its adherents support 
that context-rich experiments may tell us more about individuals’ reactions in specific real world contexts 
(Ward et al., 2008).  
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returns to storage from deferred futures plus historical basis is an appropriate way to make 
grain storage decisions.  
In summary, the literature that explores risk preferences and grain marketing with 
primary data uses mainly surveys (Davis et al., 2005; Sartwelle et al. 2000; Goodwin and 
Kastens, 1996) or no random samples (e.g. Shapiro and Brorsen, 1988; Musser, Patrick, 
Eckman, 1996).  The instruments used to measure risk attitudes are mostly Likert-type or 
other type self-assessed scales (e.g. Musser, Patrick, Eckman, 1996; Davis et al. 2005; 
Shapiro and Brorsen, 1988; Sartwelle et al. 2000; Goodwin and Kastens, 1996; Mattos and 
Zinn, 2016).  Only three studies by Lee, Bellemare and Just (2017), Ruhinduka et al. 
(2017), and Mattos and Zinn (2016) used experimental methods to elicit risk preferences. 
 
2.3 Simulation Games and Experimental Economics 
Simulation games have been widely used in experimental economics because both 
(games and experimental economics) focus on replicating real world as faithfully as 
possible (Borawski, 2016). Friedman, Pommerenke, Lukose, Milam, and Huberman 
(2006) tried to isolate the features that reinforce or discourage the sunk cost fallacy by 
using a “Treasure Hunt” computer game.  Participants were trying to find various amounts 
of “buried treasure” in several “islands” and researchers measured if the cost of 
approaching an “island” influences their insistence of finding the treasure.  Kimbrough and 
Wilson (2013) used a virtual world to investigate the effect of an exogenous ecological 
shock on the informal principles of property rights and exchange.  They tested how an 
ecological shock as a severe drought can cause institutional evolution and replace private 
property with new informal routines.  Dorschner and Musshoff (2015) incorporated a 
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business simulation game in a 4-stage experiment in order to test if incentive-based nature 
protection policies reduce biodiversity losses. 
In general, simulation games can serve the experimental design in a broad range of 
economic research.  To the best of our knowledge, an experiment with a grain marketing 
simulation game hasn’t been conducted yet.  As a result, MINE represents an excellent 
opportunity to investigate the behavior of producers towards price risk in a grain marketing.  
Its software flexibility allows the experimenter to design experiments as simple as possible 
and as complex yet realistic as necessary keeping in mind the grain marketing knowledge 
level of the subject pool.  Decision-training games as MINE can be a tool in researching 
human behavior and interactions (Borawski, 2016).  Because of their education-oriented 
character, they are accessed by a large group of people, which increases the generalizability 
of the simulation results.  Moreover, economic experiments involving human subjects 
require their maximum engagement, which is difficult to achieve.  Games are a useful tool 
to attract the subjects’ attention (Borawski, 2016).  Recent sociotechnical developments 
involving computer games have created new kinds of research in the social and behavioral 
sciences (Bainbridge 2007). 
 
3. Theoretical Background 
3.1. Safety First and other decision criteria  
 
As it was mentioned in our Introduction, in this study we experimentally test the 
applicability of Levy’s and Levy’s (2009) Safety First – Expected Utility (SF-EU) decision 
rule on grain marketing decisions.  Levy and Levy developed a decision rule that is a hybrid 
between Safety First criterion and standard expected utility maximization.  Also, they 
empirically investigated the robustness of their model by designing an experiment with 
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context-free tasks that elicited participants’ SF preferences.  In this Section, we reproduce 
and discuss Levy’s and Levy’s work, since we use in our study their theoretical approach 
as well as their experimental tasks to associate the EU-SF preferences with grain marketing 
decisions.  First, it is important to recall the SF criterion.  Roy (1952) suggested that under 
uncertainty individuals are more concerned with avoiding “a disaster” than with reaching 
the maximum net increase in satisfaction.13  Different individuals may set different disaster 
levels.  Roy (1952) provided as potential examples of disaster the net loss out of an 
economic activity, or the lowest income made in an occupation than what another 
occupation would yield.   The principle of SF asserts that since for many people the idea 
of a disaster exists, it is sensible that, in practice, they try to minimize the probability of 
this catastrophe.  Levy and Levy (2009) formally described SF criterion as follows: 
Consider two alternative prospects F and G and a “disaster” level d. 
F is preferred to G if and only if: 
𝑃𝑟𝐹(𝑥 < 𝑑) <  𝑃𝑟𝐺  (𝑥 < 𝑑), 
that is, prospect F is preferred to prospect G if the probability of experiencing an outcome 
lower than the disaster level (x<d) is lower under prospect F than under prospect G.  
However, as Levy and Levy explain, the strict implementation of the SF criterion where 
individuals solely seek to minimize the probability of a bad outcome to happen, may lead 
to paradoxical behaviors. They provide the following example: 
                                                            
13 Roy’s major objections on approaching behavior under uncertainty with expected value or utility 
maximization principles are the following: 1) Expected utility maximization requires an individual to 
consider all possible outcomes of a given prospect and find the expected outcome if this action was repeated 
many times. 2) It is not necessary that an individual has a precise knowledge of the probabilities of all possible 
outcomes of an action and furthermore, it is not necessary that she is able to extend her knowledge about 
what future holds. 
37 
 
Prospect F Prospect G 
$ 0.01 with certainty $ -0.01 with probability 0.1% 
 $ 1,000,000 with probability 99% 
  
A strict implementation of SF rule implies that prospect F dominates G because it 
minimizes the probability of a negative outcome.  Nevertheless, it is obvious that the 
majority of people would prefer prospect G, because the distribution of the outcomes 
matters too.  What Levy and Levy suggest is that even though SF matters in decision-
making process, is not the only factor that is taken into consideration when making 
decisions between risky prospects.14  
Levy and Levy (2009) conducted a two-stage experiment to evaluate the extent to 
which people’s risk preferences can be explained by SF.  Part of their experiment was to 
test SF versus other decision criteria.  These criteria were the Mean-Variance Rule, Second 
Order Stochastic Dominance, Prospect Theory, and Cumulative Prospect Theory.  Because 
Levy and Levy (2009) review these criteria, we only discuss them briefly here.  
                                                            
14 If we project strict SF preferences in an EU framework we see that the utility function is not continuous 
because in SF an individual has a constant utility level above and below the disaster level regardless of the 
value of x.  
 
Source: Levy and Levy (2009) 
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The Mean-Variance rule introduced by Markowitz (1952) suggests that the optimal 
portfolio is the one with the highest expected return and the lowest variance.  More 
specifically, in the case of two portfolios that have the same expected return, investors 
should pick the one with the lowest variance of return, or in case of two portfolios with the 
equal variance, investors should select the one with the maximum expected return (mean).  
If the distribution (of the expected return) is normal, the Markowitz Mean -Variance rule 
gives the optimal solution in the Expected Utility Framework.  However, if the distribution 
is not normal or additional factors than mean and variance influence preferences then 
broader decision criteria should be used.  Based on Levy and Levy (2009) such criteria are 
the First Stochastic Dominance (FSD) and the Second Stochastic Dominance (SSD).  
Hadar and Russell (1969) define FSD and SSD as following: 
 The probability function g is said to be at least as large as f in the sense of 
FSD if and only if the cumulative distribution G(𝑥𝑖) is smaller than the cumulative 
distribution F(𝑥𝑖) .  
G(𝑥𝑖) ≤  F(𝑥𝑖), for all 𝑥𝑖 ∈ Χ.                                                                                      
This holds anytime that one cumulative distribution is placed entirely, or partly, above the 
other. 
 The probability function g is said to be at least as large as f in the sense of SSD if 
and only if the area under one cumulative distribution is equal to, or larger than the area 
under the other cumulative distribution. 
∫ 𝐺(𝑦)𝑑𝑦 ≤ ∫ 𝐹(𝑦)𝑑𝑦
𝑥
𝑥1
𝑥
𝑥1
 , for all x ∈ in the closed interval I. 
Later, we will show graphically the prospects that dominate based on SSD in 
Levy’s and Levy’s study.  The last theory that is involved in this study is Prospect Theory 
39 
 
(PT).  It was introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and it asserts that individuals 
are risk averse with respect to gains and risk – seeking with respect to losses.  The extension 
of PT is the Cumulative Prospect Theory (CTP) (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). CTP can 
be applied in continuous distributions, does not violate FSD and allows for different 
decisions weights for gains and losses instead of equal decision weights for all outcomes 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).  Also, it suggests that individuals decide between 
uncertain outcomes based on decision weights that are different from the prospects’ stated 
probabilities.  The function that links decision weights with stated probabilities is called 
weighting function. 
3.2. The EU-SF criterion 
 
As it was explained in the beginning of Section 3, SF decision criterion might lead 
in paradoxical decisions.  In this part, we discuss and prove how the EU-SF criterion, 
resolves this limitation of SF rule.  
Consider to prospects F and G with outcomes x ∈ [α,b] with probability density 
functions f(x) and g(x).  
We normalize the utility function such that U(α)=0 and U(b)=1. 
The Expected Utility of each prospect is: 
𝐸𝐹𝑈(𝑥) =  ∫ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑈(𝑥)𝑑𝑥      𝑎𝑛𝑑       𝐸𝐺𝑈(𝑥) = ∫ 𝑔(𝑥)𝑈(𝑥)
𝑏
𝛼
𝑏
𝑎
𝑑𝑥 
If we take the difference Δ between the expected utilities: 
𝛥 = 𝐸𝐹𝑈(𝑥) − 𝐸𝐺𝑈(𝑥) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑈(𝑥) − 𝑔(𝑥)𝑈(𝑥)
𝑏
𝛼
𝑑𝑥 = ∫ [𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑔(𝑥)]𝑈(𝑥)𝑑𝑥  (1)
𝑏
𝛼
 
Integrating by parts and substituting for F(b)=G(b)=1 and F(α)=G(α)=0 we get: 
Δ=∫ [𝐺(𝑥) − 𝐹(𝑥)]𝑈′(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑏
𝛼
      (2) 
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(2)  This holds for any utility function. 
Levy and Levy (2009) used the following utility function as example for their analysis: 
𝑈𝑆𝐹(𝑥) = {
𝑈(𝑥) − 𝑘, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 < 𝑑                               
𝑈(𝑥)𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 ≥ 𝑑                                   (3)
 
The greater the k the bigger the divergence from the EU outcome.  Stated differently, the 
greater the k the greater the impact of SF in decisions.  
Finding the difference in utility between two prospects (see eq. (1)): 
𝐸𝐹𝑈(𝑥) =  ∫ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑈(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 − 𝑘 ∫ 𝑓(𝑥)
𝑑
𝛼
𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑏
𝑎
𝐸𝐺𝑈(𝑥) = ∫ 𝑔(𝑥)𝑈(𝑥)
𝑏
𝛼
𝑑𝑥 − 𝑘 ∫ 𝑔(𝑥)
𝑑
𝛼
 
𝛥𝑆𝐹(𝑥) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑈(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 − 𝑘 ∫ 𝑓(𝑥)
𝑑
𝛼
𝑏
𝑎
− ∫ 𝑔(𝑥)𝑈(𝑥)
𝑏
𝛼
𝑑𝑥 + 𝑘 ∫ 𝑔(𝑥)
𝑑
𝛼
= 
∫ 𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑔(𝑥)𝑈(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 − 𝑘 ∫ 𝑓(𝑥)
𝑑
𝛼
𝑏
𝑎
− 𝑔(𝑥)𝑑𝑥     (4) 
Integration of the above integrals yields: 
𝛥𝑆𝐹(𝑥) = ∫ [𝐺(𝑥) − 𝐹(𝑥)]𝑈
′(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + 𝑘[𝐺(𝑑) − 𝐹(𝑑)]
𝑏
𝑎
  (5) 
The additional 𝑘[𝐺(𝑑) − 𝐹(𝑑)] is the impact of SF on decisions. 
Based on eq. (5) F is preferred over G if and only if 
 𝛥𝑆𝐹(𝑥) = ∫ [𝐺(𝑥) − 𝐹(𝑥)]𝑈
′(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + 𝑘[𝐺(𝑑) − 𝐹(𝑑)]
𝑏
𝑎
 >0, 
Dividing both sides by k+1, 
1
𝑘+1
∫ [𝐺(𝑥) − 𝐹(𝑥)]𝑈′(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 +
𝑘
𝑘+1
[𝐺(𝑑) − 𝐹(𝑑)]
𝑏
𝑎
, 
Setting α=
𝑘
𝑘+1
, and 1 − 𝛼 =
1
𝑘+1
 we obtain the EU-SF criterion: 
Proposition 1: For all preference u ∈ 𝑈𝑆𝐹 the following holds: 
F is preferred over G (1-α) ∫ [𝐺(𝑥) − 𝐹(𝑥)]𝑈′(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + 𝑎[𝐺(𝑑) − 𝐹(𝑑)]
𝑏
𝑎
> 0  (6) or 
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F is preferred over G (1-α) [ 𝐸𝐹𝑈(𝑥) − 𝐸𝐺𝑈(𝑥)] + 𝑎[𝐺(𝑑) − 𝐹(𝑑)] > 0    (7).
15 
 
3.3. Tasks that experimentally test the existence of SF preference and its extent. 
 
3.3.1. Tasks with equal expected values. 
 
Levy and Levy (2009) experimentally tested the existence of SF preferences with 
two ways.  First, they investigated whether SF preferences matter when participants make 
decisions.  Second, they quantitatively assessed the weight that SF preferences have in 
decision-making process.  Regarding the first objective of their experiment Levy and Levy 
(2009) designed five tasks where each task had two alternative prospects.  The expected 
values of the two prospects were equal.  The key characteristic in the design is that each 
prospect dominated the other by different decision-making criteria.  Below there is a 
detailed explanation of all five tasks. 
 
Table 1: Experimental Task 1  
TASK 1 
 
F                     Probability 
 
G                      Probability 
-80,000 0.25 
 
-30,000 0.25 
10,000 0.25 
 
-10,000 0.25 
20,000 0.25 
 
-5,000 0.25 
150,000 0.25 
 
145,000 0.25 
     
Exp Value 25000 
 
Exp Value 25000 
 
Table 1 presents task 1 where prospect F dominates prospect G by Safety First Rule 
because the probability of experiencing a loss is lower (1/4) under F than under G (3/4).  
                                                            
15 For the properties of EU-SF criterion see Levy and Levy (2009). 
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The disaster level is assumed to be zero.  However, G dominates F by SSD, PT, CPT, and 
Mean-Variance rule. The SSD of G over F can be easily understood with the following 
figure.  
Figure 10: SSD of F over G in Task 1 
 
In figure 10, the area below the cumulative distribution G is greater than the area 
under the cumulative distribution F.  Stated differently, for a risk averse person, prospect 
G involves less risk than prospect F.  The maximum possible loss under G(-30,000) is 
lower than the maximum possible loss under F(-80,000).  To show the dominance of 
prospect G over F under PT and CPT, Levy and Levy (2009) used the value function and 
the parameters estimated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
Consider the following value function: 
{
𝑥𝛼 ,                𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≥ 0,
−𝜆(−𝑥)𝛽,   𝑖𝑓 𝑥 < 0
   (6) 
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Where x is the monetary outcome of a prospect, α and β are the exponents of the 
value function and λ is the loss-aversion coefficient.16  Tversky and Kahneman estimated 
these parameters as follows: α= β=0.88 and λ=2.25.  To show the dominance of Prospect 
G over prospect F under PT we substitute the parameters and the values of each prospect 
on the value function (6). 
Expected Value under Prospect F: 
𝐸𝑉𝐹 =  −2.25(80,000
0.88)
1
4
+ (10,0000.88)
1
4
+ (20,0000.88)
1
4
+(150,0000.88)
1
4
= - 286.7 
𝐸𝑉𝐺 =  −2.25(30,000
0.88)
1
4
 − 2.25(10,0000.88)
1
4
− 2.25(5,0000.88)
1
4
+(145,0000.88)
1
4
= 936.1 
𝐸𝑉𝐺(936.1) > 𝐸𝑉𝐹(−286.7). Therefore, Prospect G dominates Prospect F under Prospect 
Theory. 
To show the dominance of Prospect G over prospect F under CPT we first calculate 
the weighting functions.  The values of the weighting functions will then replace the 
objective probabilities in the value function. 
𝑤+(𝑝) =
𝑝𝛾
(𝑝𝛾+(1−𝑝)𝛾)
1
𝛾
  for gains, and 𝑤−(𝑝) =
𝑝𝛿
(𝑝𝛿+(1−𝑝)𝛿)
1
𝛿
 for losses, where p is the 
cumulative probability, γ and δ are constants that determine the curvature of the weighting 
functions and has been estimated as 0.61 and 0.69 respectively (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992). 
𝑤+(𝑝) =
𝑝𝛾
(𝑝𝛾+(1−𝑝)𝛾)
1
𝛾
=>  𝑤+ (
1
4
) =
1
4
0.61
((
1
4
)0.61+(1−
1
4
)
0.61
)
1
0.61
=>  𝑤+ (
1
4
) =
0.43
1.48
= 0.291 
𝑤−(𝑝) =
𝑝𝛿
(𝑝𝛿 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛿)
1
𝛿
=> 𝑤− (
1
4
) =
1
4
0.69
((
1
4)
0.69+ (1 −
1
4)
0.69
)
1
0.69
=>  𝑤− (
1
4
) =
0.38
1.38
= 0.294 
                                                            
16 “λ>1 indicates how much a $1 loss is overweighed than $1 gain” (Levy and Levy, 2009).  
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𝐸𝑉𝐹 =  −2.25(80,000
0.88)0.294 + (10,0000.88)0.291 +  (20,0000.88)0.291 + +(150,0000.88)0.291=-
462.3 
𝐸𝑉𝐺 =  −2.25(30,000
0.88)0.294 − 2.25(10,0000.88)0.294 − 2.25(5,0000.88)0.294+ 
+(145,0000.88)0.291 = =1002.4 
𝐸𝑉𝐺(1002.4) > 𝐸𝑉𝐹(−462.3).   
Therefore, Prospect G dominates Prospect F under Cumulative Prospect Theory.  
Finally, to show the dominance of Prospect over F under the Mean-Variance rule we only 
need to compare the variances of the two prospects since the mean values are the same 
(𝜇𝐹 = 𝜇𝐺 = 25,000). 
𝜎𝐹 = 82,006  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎𝐺 = 69,911. Since 𝜎𝐺 < 𝜎𝐹 prospect G dominates prospect F under 
Mean-Variance Rule. 
For the rest four we followed the same process and we provide the values of each prospect 
under each decision theory.  
Table 2: Experimental Task 2 
TASK 2 
 
F                     Probability 
 
G                        Probability 
-10,000 0.20 -40,000 0.2 
-8,000 0.20 1,000 0.2 
-7,000 0.20 2,000 0.2 
-6,000 0.20 5,000 0.2 
60,000 0.20 61,000 0.2 
Exp Value 5800 Exp Valule 5800 
 
 
In task 2 (table 2), Prospect G dominates Prospect F by Safety First Rule because 
the probability of experiencing a loss is lower (1/5) under G than under F of (4/5).  
45 
 
Additionally, F dominates G by SSD, and Mean-Variance rule.  The SSD of F over G is 
shown in figure 11.17  
Figure 11: SSD F over G in Task 2 
 
Table 3: Experimental Task 3 
 TASK 3  
F             Probability  G             Probability 
-800 0.33  -400 0.33 
200 0.33  -100 0.33 
1,500 0.33  1,400 0.33 
Exp Value 297  Exp Value 297 
 
In task 3 (table 3), Prospect F dominates Prospect G by Safety First Rule because 
the probability of experiencing a loss is lower (1/3) under G than under F of (2/3).  
                                                            
17 Since F second-order stochastically dominates G, F dominates by Mean-Variance rule as well (Levy and 
Levy, 2009) 
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Additionally, G dominates F by SSD, PT, CPT, and Mean-Variance rule. The SSD of G 
over F is shown in figure 12. 
Figure 12: SSD G over F in Task 3 
 
Expected Values of Task 3 under PT: 
𝐸𝑉𝐹 = -25.56 < 𝐸𝑉𝐺  = 6.24 
Expected Values of Task 3 under CPT: 
𝑤+ ( 
1
3
) = 0.33 and 𝑤− ( 
1
3
) = 0.35 
𝐸𝑉𝐹 = -39 < 𝐸𝑉𝐺  = -2.9 
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Table 4: Experimental Task 4 
 TASK 4  
F                     Probability  G                    Probability 
-40,000 0.33  -80,000 0.33 
-10,000 0.33  20,000 0.33 
140,000 0.33  150,000 0.33 
Exp Value 29700  Exp Value 29700 
 
In task 4 (table 4), Prospect G dominates Prospect F by Safety First Rule because 
the probability of experiencing a loss is lower (1/3) under G than under F of (2/3).  Also, F 
dominates G by SSD, PT, CPT, and Mean-Variance rule. The SSD of G over F is shown 
in figure 13. 
Figure 13: SSD F over G in Task 4 
 
 
Expected Values of Task 4 under PT: 
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𝐸𝑉𝐹 = 360 > 𝐸𝑉𝐺  = -1,471 
Expected Values of Task 4 under CPT: 
𝐸𝑉𝐹 = -166.82 > 𝐸𝑉𝐺  = -2244.5 
Table 5: Experimental Task 5 
 TASK 5  
F                              Probability  G                               Probability 
   -6,000 0.2 
-2,500 0.6  -2,500 0.2 
15,000 0.4  1,000 0.2 
   15,000 0.4 
     
Exp Value 4500  Exp Value 4500 
 
In task 5 (table 5), Prospect G dominates Prospect F by Safety First Rule because 
the probability of experiencing a loss is lower (2/5) under G than under F of (3/5).  
Additionally, F dominates G by SSD, PT, CPT, Mean-Variance rule, and the “number of 
minus signs” criterion. The SSD of G over F is shown in figure 14. 
Figure 14: SSD F over G in Task 5 
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Expected Values of Task 5 under PT: 
𝐸𝑉𝐹 = 2479 > 𝐸𝑉𝐺  = 589 
Expected Values of Task 5 under CPT: 
𝐸𝑉𝐹 = 610.95 > 𝐸𝑉𝐺  = 77.44 
3.3.2. Tasks for assessing the relative weight of SF in decisions 
 
The second part of the Levy and Levy (2009) experiment involved two tasks, where 
each task had two alternative prospects.  One prospect dominated by SF as before.  
However, the other prospect had the last possible outcome blank.  Participants were asked 
to state the value that would make them indifferent between the two prospects.  The 
magnitude of this value determined how much (if any) weight each participant places in 
SF.  
 
Table 6: Experimental Task 6   
TASK 6 
  
F 
   
G 
-12,000 0.33 
 
-8,000 0.33 
2,000 0.33 
 
-2,000 0.33 
30,000 0.33 
 
X 0.33 
 
Prospect F dominates Prospect G by SF.  If x=30,000 then the two prospects yield 
equal mean value.  For x=30,000 a risk-averse person would prefer G over F since the 
possible loss is smaller over G(-10,000) than over F(-12,000).  A value higher than 30,000 
implies that individuals place value to SF.18  That is, the higher the value they state the 
higher the amount that is required to offset the increased probability (of prospect G) to 
                                                            
18 For values of X lower than 30,000 we assume absence of SF preferences and therefore α=0. 
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experience a loss.  As Levy and Levy (2009) state “The more the subjects care about SF, 
the higher X should be (everything else equal).”  Task 7 allowed the authors to get a second 
independent estimate of α for the same individual for different probabilities and outcomes.  
In this case, the two prospects are equal when x=54,000. 
Table 7: Experimental Task 7 
 
 
                TASK 7 
 
F                              Probability 
 
G                               Probability 
   
-12,000 0.25 
 
-26,000 0.25 
-5,000 0.25 
 
3,000 0.25 
1,000 0.25 
 
4,000 0.25 
X 0.25 
 
55,000 0.25 
It is useful to explain how the values provided by participants in task 6 and task 7 
were converted to relative weight of SF in decisions, since we calculated that weight for 
our sample as well. 
Task 6 
Consider the following utility function: 
U(x)= Ax+B, (A>0) 
We normalize the utility function, as we did when we derived the SF-EU condition (see 
Section 3.2.), such as U(-12,000)=0 and U(X)=1.   
By solving for A and B we get: 
A = 
1
𝑋+12,000
 and B = 
12,000
𝑋+12,000
  
Therefore 𝐸𝐹𝑈(𝑥) =
1
3
(
−12,000
𝑋+12,000
) +
1
3
(
2,000
𝑋+12,000
)+
1
3
(
30,000
𝑋+12,000
)   and  
𝐸𝐺𝑈(𝑥) =
1
3
(
−8,000
𝑋+12,000
) +
1
3
(
−2,000
𝑋+12,000
)+
1
3
(
𝑋
𝑋+12,000
) 
Consider the necessary condition of SF-EU preferences: 
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(1-α) [ 𝐸𝐹𝑈(𝑥) − 𝐸𝐺𝑈(𝑥)] + 𝑎[𝐺(𝑑) − 𝐹(𝑑)] > 0   (𝑠𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑞. (7)).   
For a person to be indifferent between the 2 prospects we need to change the inequality to 
equality.  By substituting 𝐸𝐹𝑈(𝑥) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝐺𝑈(𝑥) into the indifference condition becomes: 
 
(1-α) 
1
3
[(
−12,000+2,000+30,000+8,000+2,000−𝑋
𝑋+12,000
) + α (
2
3
−
1
3
) = 0. 
By solving for α: 
α= 
𝛸−30,000
2𝑋−18,000
  (8), where X is individual’s answer in task 6. 
Hence, eq. 8 gives the relative weight of SF in decision for any individual.   
 
Task 7 
The process is the same for task 7.  For preferences expressed from a utility 
function of the form: U(x)= Ax+B, (A>0), the relative weight of SF for task 7 is: α= 
𝛸−54,000
3𝑋−2,000
. 19 
Some general comments about Levy’s and Levy’s (2009) experimental design.  
First, they tested the existence of SF preferences in a broad range of monetary units (e.g. 
hundreds of dollars, tens of thousands, and hundreds of thousands).  Second, they 
controlled for the side that the SF outcome was in each task (e.g. in task 1 SF outcome was 
on left-hand side, in task 2 it was on the right-hand side etc.).  However, they provided 
economic incentives for only one out of five tasks of the first part.  This is something that 
we tried to address in our study by converting Experimental Currency Units (ECUs) into 
                                                            
19 Levy and Levy estimated α with other utility functions.  They didn’t find α to be sensitive under different 
preferences.   
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real dollars instead of directly using real dollars.  In Section 4, there is a detailed discussion 
about subjects’ compensation. 
4. Experimental Design 
The advantage of using laboratory experimental methods in economics is that they 
allow for examination of an individuals’ specific behavior holding everything else constant 
(Levitt and List, 2007).  This would be hard to be examined with an alternative method 
(Levitt and List, 2007).  In a lab experiment, the researcher is able to change the parameter 
of interest (set of prices, information set etc.) and observe the effect of this change (Levitt 
and List, 2007).  Experiments, generally are subject of criticism in the sense that a human 
behavior produced in the lab may not be alike with the behavior in real world.  Although 
lab experiments may not result in an accurate quantitative answer, their qualitative findings 
are likely to be relevant to what one would observe outside of the lab (Levitt and List, 
2007).  Due to the difficulty of collecting primary data on marketing behavior from a 
random sample, we believe that a lab experimental approach was appropriate for this study.  
Even if our results may not be quantitatively precise, they may closely approximate actual 
marketing decisions compared to theoretical studies on marketing. 
4.1. Within-Subject design 
 
To meet the objectives of this study we designed a 3-stage within-subject context-
rich experiment (See figure 15).  In a within-subject design, subjects participate 
sequentially in more than one treatments (Charness, Gneezy and Kuhn, 2012).  This 
experimental design allowed us to test the behavior of the same subject under different 
market conditions, after controlling for her risk preferences.  The main advantage of a 
within-subject design is its relevance to many theoretical concepts (Charness, Gneezy and 
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Kuhn, 2012).  For example, usually experimenters are more interested in observing the 
change in the behavior of the same subject, as a response to a change of a given condition 
(communication vs no communication), than observing different individuals under 
different conditions.  This reduces subject variability as the subject is its own control. As 
Wag, Wang, and Gong (2009) say, in this design “the subject serves as his own matched 
control”.  However, the within-subject design is more likely to suffer from Experimenter 
Demand Effects (EDE) (Charness, Gneezy and Kuhn, 2012).  Later we explain how we 
tackled this issue.  
The alternative of within-subject design is the between-subject design.  In this case, 
the experimenter randomly splits participants into sub-samples and each sub-sample is 
exposed to one treatment only.  Between-subject designs yield to more conservative tests 
and therefore tend to be more desirable to experimenters (Charness, Gneezy and Kuhn, 
2012).  However, the context of the study is important when it comes to design decisions 
(Charness, Gneezy and Kuhn, 2012).  The way that grain marketing functions is closer to 
within-subject design since producers face grain marketing years sequentially and each 
year is different than the previous.   
Figure 15: Stages of the Experiment 
 
4.2.  Subject Pool 
 
In this study, the experimental subjects were undergraduate and graduate students 
from the University of Nebraska in Lincoln as well as from the Nebraska College of 
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Technical Agriculture in Curtis.  The latter is a 2 years college where students are being 
specialized in areas related to grain production and animal production.  A common question 
that is asked when an experiment is conducted with convenience samples is whether the 
results would be the same if the sample was drawn from a heterogeneous population 
(Druckman and Kam, 2011).  Stated differently, there is a concern that student samples 
reduce the external validity of an experiment.  Druckman and Kam (2011) argued that it is 
acceptable to run an experiment with students if there is no prior work in this area.  Since 
this experiment is part of an exploratory research we believe that the use of student sample 
is not problematic.  If prior work in this research area existed, then a heterogeneous sample 
would contribute more to the literature than the student sample.  Additionally, in this study 
we are mostly interested in detecting behaviors that are “conceptually equivalent” 
(Anderson and Bushman, 1997) to what we would detect in real world (Druckman and 
Kam, 2011).  That is, we expect our results to be qualitatively and not quantitively similar 
to reality.  Of course, we should not forget that grain marketing is a specialized topic and 
there is a plausible concern that a student sample may empirically differ from the 
population.  By recruiting students from both campuses, we created a random sample which 
included both experienced and unexperienced subjects in farming and grain marketing.  
Nevertheless, a repetition of this study with producers is an important extension. 
4.3. Description of the simulation game  
 
As it is depicted in the flowchart, in stage 1 subjects completed the seven tasks 
designed by Levy and Levy (2009).  Since an analytical description of all seven tasks has 
been provided in Section 3, here we will directly discuss Stage 2.  In stage 2, participants 
were asked to participate in a grain marketing simulation game.  This game is called 
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Marketing in a New Era (MINE) and its initial purpose was to serve as a learning tool in 
grain marketing extension meetings in Nebraska.20  We analytically discuss its functions 
and its contribution to Nebraska producers in Chapter 1.  In this section, we will only 
mention the key attributes of this simulation that led us to incorporate it into the 
experimental design of the study.  The MINE simulation game provides users a platform 
representing producers’ grain marketing environment.  As in any simulation game, 
concessions must be made between the game and the real world.  MINE provides users the 
opportunity to sell grain at pre-determined decision points.  At each decision point, the user 
can execute cash, futures and basis contracts for any amount of grain.  MINE can be 
simplified to focus on certain objectives by limiting the contract type.  In the experiment, 
we focused only on cash contracts. 21  Figures 16 and 17 show the contract types under the 
original and the simplified version of MINE respectively. 
                                                            
20 The website of the Marketing in a New Era simulation is mine.unl.edu 
21 This study focuses on contracts for spot delivery and contracts for futures delivery.  We will not elaborate 
on futures contracts, basis contracts, hedge to arrive contracts, options etc. because their analysis goes beyond 
the purposes of this study.  Also, we cover only short hedging (selling grain with futures contracts) and not 
long hedging (buying grain with futures contracts).   
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Figure 16: Decision Screen with cash, futures and basis contracts   
 
Figure 17: Simplified Decision Screen 
 
   
We used the simplified version of MINE (figure 17) because it allows to work with 
subjects that were not necessarily familiar with the grain marketing process without 
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discounting the research objectives.  The yellow boxes in the “cash” column include corn 
prices that the user could lock at.  The first price in this column is the price offered in the 
spot market for immediate delivery and therefore there is no storage cost associated with 
it.  The remaining prices are prices for futures delivery.  This means that the subject will 
receive the price she locked minus the storage cost that is associated with the respective 
month.  For example, a contract created in October for December delivery at the price of 
4.2 ECUs (see figure 17) means that the user will receive 4.2 ECUs no matter what the spot 
price will be in December.  However, she will pay a storage cost for keeping the grain 
stored for 2 months.   
Another important feature of MINE game is the way that futures and cash corn 
prices are portrayed in today’s price environment.  MINE contains actual prices that have 
been previously experienced going back to the early 1990.22  However, these prices do not 
reflect today’s prices.  In order to link the historical price series and the current prices 
MINE starts with an administrator defined current price, called the initial price.  Each 
historical price series is converted into a percent change in price from one day to the next.  
The initial price is the input that creates the new price series based on the historical percent 
change price series.  This feature was crucial for our study because it allowed us to create 
various price treatments and to test behavior under actual market conditions without 
intervening in price series’ patterns. 
                                                            
22 This data is available in CME group website (https://www.cmegroup.com/). 
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4.4. Price Treatments 
 
Our study involved four different price treatments.  Each treatment represented a 
different marketing year and hence, a different market environment.  Participants did not 
receive any prior information about market environment.  We did emphasize in the 
instructions that the prices observed were not related in any way to other treatments’ prices 
or to subjects’ performance in previous treatments.  The four price treatments were selected 
by finding years with specific price characteristics.  In Treatment 1 (hereafter “Stable” 
Price Series or T1) the prices did not change drastically as the marketing year evolved.  The 
purpose of this treatment was to test what are the behavioral characteristics of the subjects 
who chose to sell later in the year even though spot prices did not differ substantially.  Other 
price series provided larger changes in prices throughout the marketing year.  The price 
series used for T1 came from the 1992 marketing year, Figure 18.  T1 provided carry 
opportunities (See Table 8).  In Treatment 2 (hereafter Decreasing Price Series or T2), 
prices were decreased from month to month compared to 4 ECUs October’s spot price 
(cash price at harvest) and used 2002 marketing year, Figure 19.  In addition, T2 had zero 
carry opportunities (see table 8).  Treatment 3 (hereafter Erratic Price Series or T3), did not 
have a specific (increasing or decreasing pattern) throughout the marketing year but prices 
did fluctuate.  That is, prices were increasing in one month and decreasing the next month. 
T3 used 2003 marketing year prices, Figure 20.  Finally, in Treatment 4 (hereafter 
increasing price series or T4) prices were increasing from month to month.  This price 
series had the highest net price of all treatments and its lowest price did not fall below 
production cost (3.8).  In T4 used 2006 prices, Figure 21. 
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Table 8: Overview of Price Treatments 
Price 
Treatment 
Maximum 
Price after 
Storage Cost  
Minimum Price 
after  
Storage Cost 
Average 
Price after 
Storage Cost 
Average 
Spot Price* 
Carry 
Opportunities
** 
T1 “Stable” 
Price Series 
4.6 3.5 3.75 4.15 8 
T2 Decreasing 
Price Series 
4 2.5 3.27 3.66 0 
T3 Erratic Price 
Series 
5.41 3.2 4.3 4.77 3 
T4 Increasing 
Price Series 
6.41 3.88 5.25 5.68 8 
Average 5.15 3.27 4.14 4.56 4.75 
*Price at harvest was 4 ECUs for all price treatments except 2003’s where the harvest price was 4.1 ECUs. 
** As carry opportunity we define the highest positive return to storage for a specific decision point (month).    
A carry opportunity is essentially the “reward” that the market gives to producers to keep the grain stored 
instead of selling it at the spot market. 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Price Treatment 1, “Stable” Price Series  
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Figure 19: Price Treatment 2, Declining Price Series 
 
Figure 20: Price Treatment 3, Erratic Price Series 
   
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar April May June July Aug Sept
Treatment 2: Declining Price Series
Dec Futures
March Futures
May Futures
July Futures
September Futures
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar April May June July Aug Sept
Treatment 3: Erratic Price Series
December Futures
March Futures
May Futures
July Futures
September Futures
61 
 
Figure 21: Price Treatment 4, Increasing Price Series 
 
 
4.5. Other important elements of the experimental design in Stage 2 
 
Up to now, it should be clear that a context-rich experiment was necessary in this 
study because it involved a realistic grain marketing environment while maintaining the 
benefits of a controlled lab environment.  To increase the relevance of the study to real 
world decisions, besides the price treatments, we incorporated the following additional 
elements of corn production in Nebraska: 
1) Amount of Bushels to Be Sold 
At the beginning of each marketing year subjects had 117,500 bushels available to 
sell in each treatment.  We arrived at this number through a producer operating on 640 
acres with 520 being irrigated (Figure 22).  Each irrigated acre an actual yield of 225 
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bushels per acre for a total of 117,000 bushels (520 acres *225 bushels per acre).23  Grain 
was not allowed to be carried over from one year to the next, so all grain was sold at the 
end of the simulation.  Instructions to participants made it clear that any unsold bushels at 
the end of the simulation would be automatically sold by the computer. 
Figure 22: Full Section of an irrigated crop 
 
 
2) Production Cost and Storage Cost 
We calculated production and storage costs using the 2015 Nebraska crop budgets 
for irrigated corn after soybeans.  Estimated production cost was $4.15.  We reduced this 
amount to $3.80 by removing the any expenses related to storage cost (dry grain etc.) 
because the storage cost we used in the experiment was inflated.  That is, we set a storage 
cost at 7 cents per bushel per month.  This rate was set by identifying commercial storage 
facilities while adding a bit more to ensure the cost was high enough for participants to 
notice.24 These changes facilitated the experimental design aspect of the study without 
discounting its qualitative outcome.  In general, the production cost was fixed (446,500 
ECUs) for all participants and under all treatments and it was deducted at the end of each 
                                                            
23 These figures are based on 2015 Nebraska crop budgets (http://cropwatch.unl.edu/budgets). 500 bushels 
were added to the total due to the MINE software providing bushels to be sold on 2,500 bushel increments. 
24 It is common that even producers tend to ignore some or all of their storage cost.  Other grain marketing 
simulation games as the Commodity Challenge from the University of Minnesota 
(https://commoditychallenge.com) have set a storage cost at 5 cents per bushel per month for the same reason. 
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year from subjects’ earnings.  The storage cost varied based on subjects’ marketing 
decisions.  The only marketing period price with a zero storage cost was the spot price in 
the first month, October.  The storage cost was deducted at the end of each month according 
to the quantity in storage.  The experimenter informed participants regarding the values of 
production cost and storage cost and regarding the way that they will be deducted from 
their earnings (See Instructions in the Appendix).  All costs were the same for all subjects 
and under all treatments.  This way, no one had a lower cost advantage that could affect 
her decisions of selling or storing grain.  Finally, participants received feedback about the 
costs at the end of each month and at the end of each year.  Similarly, with the amount of 
grain, future research can study the change in behavior under different levels of production 
or storage cost. 
3) Timeline   
Stage 2 contained 4 periods (marketing years) with 12 rounds (months) per period 
(see figure 23).  The timeline was always available to subjects on the top of the MINE 
screen, allowing them to see in what round (month) they are in (see figure 17).  October 
was the first month in post-harvest marketing because this is the time that corn harvest is 
taking place in Nebraska (USDA Agricultural Handbook Number 628, 1997).  One may 
argue that 12 pricing opportunities are too few since in reality, each day is potentially a 
pricing opportunity, or too many since there is evidence that corn producers market their 
grain 3.95 times per marketing year (Goodwin and Kastens, 1996).25  Our decision to 
                                                            
25 This figure includes both pre-harvest and post-harvest marketing decisions. 
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involve 12 decision points was based on the fact that a considerably large number of 
decision points would allow participants plenty of opportunities to market grain. 
  
Figure 23: Flow Chart of Stage 2 
 
4) Amount of grain sold per contract 
Subjects sold in 5,000 bushel increments, which is the standard futures contract 
amount.  To facilitate the flow of the experiment we created units of 10,000, 15,000, 
20,000, 25,000 bushels (see figure 24).  This way subjects could create a contract greater 
than 5,000 at once without having to create multiple contracts of 5,000 bushels.  Regarding 
the maximum amount sold at each price there was no restriction imposed.  That is, subjects 
controlled the amount they wanted to sell at each price.  They could even sell the entire 
amount of their grain at one price if they wanted to.  In future experiments, it would be 
interesting to remove the units and let subjects type the exact amount they would like to 
sell.  
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Figure 24: Units of grain that subjects could select 
 
5) Instructions and Prior Information 
Instructions in a context-rich experiment are challenging.  The experimenter should 
introduce a context to participants that may be completely new to them in a simple way 
without influencing their behavior in any way.  To effectively communicate the context of 
our experiment we presented the instructions in a novel way.  Instead of reading loudly a 
long document, we created a presentation with animations and screenshots from the 
experimental interface which made the instructions’ clearer.  We piloted both the 
traditional method of reading the instructions and the new method of presenting them 
before we concluded that presentation was more efficient method in terms of understanding 
and in terms of timing.26  Subjects were provided with a copy of presentation’s slides as 
well as with scratch paper in case they wanted to keep notes. 
Since a complete copy of the instructions’ slides is included in the Appendix, here 
we will only provide the list with the features of Stage 2 that they were known to 
participants before the beginning of the experiment (see table 9). 
                                                            
26 At the end of the experiment we asked participants whether the instructions were clear, to verify that the 
introduction of the marketing context did not confuse them.  90% of the subjects did not have any difficulty 
to understand the instructions. 
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Table 9: Information Provided to Subjects 
Information Piece Value 
Variable or Fixed 
Across Years 
Grain Endowment 117,500 bushels Fixed 
Production Cost 3.8 ECUs/bushel 446,500 Fixed 
Storage Cost 0.07 ECUs/ bushel/month Variable 
Number of periods 4 sequential periods (years) Fixed 
Number of rounds 
48 rounds (12 sequential 
rounds per period) 
Fixed 
 
6) Information Feedback  
Subjects received feedback about the amount of grain they have sold, the earnings 
and the costs at the end of every month.  The feedback on the number of bushels sold was 
provided through a graph on the right side of the decision screen (see figure 25).  Every 
time that the subject created a contract, the percentage of grain sold changed and the level 
of the brown area in the graph rose.  Also, this graph informed participants about the initial 
amount of grain as well as about the amount of grain that was left to be sold.  In addition, 
participants were receiving feedback on a monthly basis regarding the earnings and the 
storage cost.  Figure 26 shows the feedback received at the end of each month.  Subjects 
could review the sales (price they selected to sell at multiplied by the quantity they 
indicated) and the storage cost they have incurred up to this month.27  The computer 
automatically calculated subjects’ monthly earnings by subtracting the storage cost from 
the sales.28 
                                                            
27 Storage cost until the next month includes the storage cost of the unsold amount that is transferred to the 
next month as well as the storage cost of any futures contract that expires in later month.  
28 Due to software limitations, we could not subtract production cost from sales in a monthly basis.  Therefore, 
we subtracted at once, at the end of the year.  Participants were aware that the production cost will not be 
deducted from their earnings before the end of the year. 
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Finally, at the end of each year participants were receiving feedback about the final 
earnings, the production cost and the total storage cost they incurred throughout the year.  
Figure 27 is an example of the summary screen that was provided at the end of the year.  
On the left side of the screen all sales and storage expenses are listed in descending order 
starting from the most recent incident (charge or sale).  On the right side of the screen 
earnings for that year are presented.  The total sales are the sum of all sales that executed 
throughout the year.  The production cost and the total storage cost is subtracted from the 
total sales and results in the earnings in ECUs for the specific year.  The sum of the earnings 
of all four years was the basis for subject’ payment for Stage 2 at the end of the experiment. 
The year’s summary table followed an overview of all four years (see figure 28) that 
showed what were the earnings in completed years and how many years are left until the 
conclusion of Stage 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Feedback regarding the amount of grain sold  
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Figure 26: Feedback at the end of the month 
 
Figure 27: Feedback at the end of the marketing year 
 
Figure 28: Feedback on the progress made in Stage 2 
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7) Practice period 
There was a practice period before subjects participated in Stage 2.29  Participants, 
along with the experimenter went through the first two months.  The experimenter had an 
opportunity to repeat and show in practice how the software works.  Then, the experimenter 
asked participants to complete by themselves the practice period and she replied to 
questions in person.  The price series used in the practice period was different from the 
price series used in the treatments.  However, all other features (costs, number of decision 
points etc.) were exactly the same as in the actual years. 
8) Order Effects 
Order effect is one of the Experimenter Demand Effects (EDE) (Zizzo, 2008). 30  
More specifically is a Purely Cognitive EDE that may cause confounding in within-subject 
experiments.  Simply stated, experimental subjects try to understand a context which is not 
familiar to them.  To do so, they abstract information from instructions, cues and feedback 
(Zizzo, 2008).  The order that the tasks are presented to subjects is a potential source of 
Purely Cognitive EDE, if subjects believe that they understood the objectives of the 
experiment because of the order they participated in the tasks (Zizzo, 2008).  In this case, 
subjects adjust their behavior based on their perceptions about what the objectives are and 
they do not exhibit the same behavior as if the tasks were presented separately (Zizzo, 
2008).   
                                                            
29 In Stage 1, we asked participants to complete a quick quiz to check their understanding. 
30 “Experimenter demand effects (EDE for short) refer to changes in behavior by experimental subjects due 
to cues about what constitutes appropriate behavior (behavior ‘demanded’ from them).” Zizzo, 2008).  
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A typical way to address this issue and to maintain experimental control is to 
counterbalance or to randomize the order of the treatments.  In our study, all subjects 
participated in all treatments, and therefore a control for order effects was necessary.  The 
number of possible combinations of the four treatments equals to 4! (24 different 
combinations).  Budget and time constraints make impossible the implementation of all 24 
combinations.  In this case, the experiment would require a very large number of 
experimental units in order to detect significant differences, and also, the budget and the 
time of data collection would be hiked up.  For this reason, we used the Latin Square 
Design.  In this design, each treatment is represented only once at each row and each 
column.  This way each treatment is uniformly represented both within periods and within 
sequences (Wang, Wang, and Gong, 2009).  The treatment sequences we used are 
presented in the following table: 
 
Table 10: Treatment Sequences Used 
Period 
 
Treatment 
Sequence 
1 2 3 4 
1 T1 T2 T3 T4 
2 T4 T1 T2 T3 
3 T2 T3 T4 T1 
4 T3 T4 T1 T2 
 
9) Payment 
One of the most interesting tasks of the experimental design of this study was 
subjects’ payment.  Levy and Levy (2009) introduced payment only for 1 of the tasks and 
only for one participant who would be picked at random.  In their study, they stated that 
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monetary incentives are important and that the results of the task that involved the potential 
of a payment were even more significant (Levy and Levy, 2009).  From the other hand, it 
is difficult to incentivize properly an experiment that involves high positive and negative 
values when you pay directly in cash.  Even if we assume that there is no resource scarcity 
for the experimenter and that she could afford a payment of $150,000, it is obvious that no 
one would participate in an experiment that she may be asked to pay $80,000.  The fact 
that the values in our experiment were tens of thousands and even hundreds of thousands 
of dollars for both in Stage 1 and Stage 2 provides sufficient design motivation for using 
Experimental Currency Units (Davis and Holt, 1993; Drichoutis, Lusk, Nayga, 2015).  The 
payment happened as follows.  At the end of the experiment we were asking from a 
participant to pick a card from a shuffled deck of 5 cards.  Each card represented one of 
the first five tasks in Stage 1.31  Once a task from 1 up to 5 was picked, another card was 
drawn in order to determine which outcome will be used for subjects’ payment.  The 
number of cards varied depending on the number of outcomes that the selected task had. 
For example, the first task had 3 possible outcomes, so the subject had to choose 
between 3 cards.  The outcome of the Stage 1 (either negative or positive) was then added 
to the earnings from Stage 2.  The earnings in Stage 2 were the sum of the earnings in all 
four games.  Once earnings from Stage 1 and Stage 2 in ECUs were added up, we converted 
them to real dollars at an exchange rate of $1 per 12,611 ECUs.  After piloting the 
experiment with more than 20 individuals we realized that based on the average earnings 
                                                            
31 We did not provide monetary incentives for the last 2 tasks in Stage 1, because the potential of a payment 
would encourage subjects to state a higher value than their actual preference.  Even though there are payment 
methods that address these sort of issues, that would require more time spent in instructions and would 
complicate further the experiment.  Therefore, we excluded the last 2 tasks of Stage 1 from the payment 
process.  
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from stage 2, and an additional flat show-up fee of $7, even if the payment from Stage 1 
was negative, it was unlikely that someone earn less than $7.  On average participants 
earned $22.1, with a standard deviation of $6.82, a minimum of $7 and a maximum of $40. 
4.6. Stage 3: Survey 
 
After completing Stage 2, subjects were asked to participate in a socio-demographic 
survey (see Appendix).  The survey had three main sections that each of them controlled 
respectively for i) familiarity with the concept of Expected Value and probability theory 
ii) typical demographic characteristics as age, gender, field of major studies etc., and iii) 
familiarity with farming and grain marketing.  The purpose of the first section was to 
associate (if necessary) the level of individuals’ understanding on probability theory, with 
their responses in Stage 1.  Also, it allowed us to group the observations of subjects with 
low understanding of probability theory and check if they are statistically significantly 
different than others.  The second part of the survey allowed us to make comparisons 
between different genders, age groups, nationalities, professional orientations etc.  Finally, 
the third part of the survey provided us an evidence on whether subjects that have farming 
background and they are familiar with grain marketing would exhibit a different behavior 
compared to subjects who don’t.  Since our sample consisted of undergraduate and 
graduate students and not producers, it was critical to have an evidence on whether 
experienced individuals behave differently that inexperienced. 
5. Analysis and Results 
 
The experimental sessions of this study conducted in the University of Nebraska in 
Lincoln and in Nebraska College of Technical Agriculture in Curtis.  We followed all 
necessary procedures imposed by the Institutional Review Board and also, we did not use 
73 
 
deception in any stage of our experiment.  We ran a total of 15 sessions and each subject 
could participate only once. 11 sessions took place in Lincoln and 4 sessions in Curtis. As 
it was mentioned in Section 4, to control for order effects we worked with four different 
treatment sequences.  Table 11 contains the number of subjects participated in each order.  
Participation in NCTA was lower than the expected and this is the reason that the number 
of subjects is not balanced in between campuses.  However, our sample is balanced across 
different treatment sequences.  More specifically we collected data from 33participants in 
each price sequence. 32 
Table 11: Number of Experimental Subjects per Treatment Sequence 
 
Treatment 
Sequence 1 
Treatment 
Sequence 2 
Treatment 
Sequence 3 
Treatment 
Sequence 4 
Total 
UNL 
Participants 
20 22 21 21* 84 
NCTA 
Participants 
13 11 11 12 47 
Total 33 33 32 33 131 
*We dropped out the observations of a participant who refused to participate in the 
survey. 
 
Our results are presented in four parts.  The first part includes the analysis of 
subjects’ Safety First preferences.  The second part provides some descriptive statistics on 
grain marketing decisions.  The third part lists the survey results and the fourth part 
proceeds to econometric results. 
5.1. Analysis of individuals Safety First Preferences 
 
Following Levy and Levy (2009), we used both the “qualitative” and the 
“quantitative” method to categorize subjects regarding their Safety First preferences. The 
qualitative approach is based on subjects’ revealed preferences on the first five tasks of 
                                                            
32 Except Treatment sequence 2 were the total number of participants was 32. 
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Stage 1 (See Section 3).  We examined in how many tasks a participant selected the Safety 
First prospect and we categorized them as it is shown in table 12. The quantitative approach 
is based on subjects’ stated preferences in the last two tasks, where participants were asked 
to input a value indicating indifference between both choices.   
Table 12: Results of Stage 1 for each Task individually 
Task 
Number of 
participants that 
selected K 
Number of 
participants that 
selected L 
Percentage  
of SF 
in each Task  
Percentages of SF 
found by Levy and 
Levy (2009) 
1 110 21 83.9% 74.7% 
2 18 113 86.3% 80.2% 
3 99 32 75.6% 78% 
4 30 101 77.1% 66% 
5 45 86 65.7% 70.9% 
 
More than 50% of individuals selected the SF prospect in each Task.  These results 
are similar to the experimental results of Levy and Levy (2009).  A potential explanation 
for any differences could be the fact that we provided monetary incentives for all five Tasks 
and not only for one task.  Overall, it is remarkable that no matter the unit of the outcome 
(hundreds, thousands etc.) the majority of participants decided according to SF and not 
according to other decision theories (Levy and Levy, 2009). 
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Table 13: Qualitative Categorization of Participants Based on the First 5 Tasks of Stage 1 
Safety First 
Category 
Criterion of Each Category 
Number of 
Participants per 
Category 
Percentage of 
the sample 
“SF” 
Participants who selected the 
Safety First prospect in all five 
tasks 
58 44.3% 
“MIX” 
Participants who selected the 
Safety First prospect in at least 
one task but in less than five 
tasks 
71 54.2% 
“NO SF” 
Participants who did not select 
any Safety First prospect in all 
five tasks 
2 1.5% 
 
We did not divide the “MIX” category into smaller ones because the five Tasks we 
used in our experiment are not ranked as they are for example in a Holt-Laury (2002) 
multiple price list.  Effectively, we cannot infer that a person who selected two SF prospects 
exhibits stronger SF preferences compared to a person that selected one.  For this reason, 
we categorized participants a conservative way which does not include any subjective 
inferences. 
Based on the relative weight placed on SF (Task 6 and Task 7 of Stage 1), we 
categorized as “α SF” the ones that the average α out of both Tasks was 1≤α>0 and as “α 
NO SF” the ones that the average α out of both Tasks was equal to 0.  
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Table 14: Relative Weight of SF based on Tasks 6 and 7 of Stage 1 
 
Value estimated 
based on 
U(X)=Ax+B 
Percentage of 
the sample 
Relative weight α 
found by Levy and 
Levy (2009) 
Average α in Task 6 
0.083 
(0.12) 
 
0.117 
(0.144) 
Average α in Task 7 
0.058 
(0.08) 
 
0.074 
(0.094) 
Average α of both Task 6 
and Task 7 
0.070 
(0.09) 
 
0.096 
 
Correlation between 
individual α parameter in 
Task 6 and Task 7 
0.48  0.74 
“α SF” Participants with 
average α of both tasks: 
0<α<1 
83 63.35%  
“α NO SF” Participants 
with average α=0 
48 36,65%  
 
For both individual estimates of α in Task 6 and Task 7, the relative weight of SF 
is slightly lower compared to Levy and Levy (2009).  This difference is not surprising 
because as Levy and Levy (2009) say “typically there is a substantial variation in α across 
subjects.  Note that this is to be expected, as subjects may have different attitudes towards 
risk, and in particular, the risk of disaster.”  However, the most interesting difference 
between our results and Levy’s and Levy’s results is that the correlation between α in Task 
6 and α in Task 7 for each individual.  Levy and Levy (2009) found a correlation of 0.74 
which is much higher than the correlation of 0.48 we found.  Even though 0.48 does not 
imply a weak relation between the two independent estimates, it demonstrates that our 
sample varied more between both measures.  However, it is important to underline that 
responses on Task 6 and Task 7 are stated and not revealed preferences in the sense that 
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we did not provide any monetary incentive for these tasks.  Table 15 shows the Spearman 
correlation between the two measures of SF preferences: 
Table 15: Correlation between the 2 measures of SF preferences 
 SF MIX NO SF αSF 
SF 1 -0.96 -0.11 0.26 
MIX -0.96 1 -0.13 -0.25 
NO SF -0.11 -0.13 1 -0.03 
αSF 0.26 -0.25 -0.03 1 
 
We separately used both the quantitative and the qualitative results to associate SF 
preferences with grain marketing decisions from Stage 2. 
 
5.2. Analysis of Individuals Grain Marketing Decisions 
 
In the grain marketing stage, each subject participated in one practice period that 
involved 12 rounds.  Then, each subject participated in 4 marketing periods (price 
treatments) with 12 rounds each, hence a total of 48 rounds.  In this part, we provide an 
overview of the results obtained from each price treatment.  Before we proceed, it is 
necessary to list the grain marketing variables that we focused on this study.  Our primary 
interest was to observe how individuals sold their available bushels throughout the year 
and their profit at the end of a year.  That is, whether they sold grain in the spot or in the 
futures market and how many contracts they created (marketing frequency) throughout the 
marketing year in different months.  Table 16 lists the variables and a brief definition of 
each variable.   
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Table 16: Grain Marketing Variables and their definitions 
Variable Definition 
Bushels Sold 
Amount of bushels sold per month regardless of the type of 
contract used 
Bushels Sold at Spot 
Market 
Amount of bushels sold per month only through cash 
contracts (at spot market) 
Marketing 
Frequency 
Number of contracts created per month 
Profit/Loss 
Monetary outcome of each year after subtracting production 
and storage cost incurred for each month 
 
Table 17 - Table 20 provide the descriptive statistics of each treatment.  These 
results suggest that except T2 on average participants had positive profits.  Also, on 
average, they marketed their grain multiple times during the year (6.98 contracts per year).  
This is different than the common approach in literature that perceives marketing as one-
time decision (Kastens and Dhuyvetter, 1999).   
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*Results are pooled across all subjects 
** 9792 bu/month on average, calculated by 117,500 bu/12 months 
*** The minimum number of contracts that a subject could execute per year was 117,500/25,000≈5, and the maximum was 117,500/5,000≈24 per year  
 
Bushels Sold Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep 
Treatment 
Average 
mean** 36870 11813 16546 11489 9866 8359 7405 4294 2710 2615 3073 2462  
Standard deviation 37862 13083 18575 11392 15192 9858 9754 8293 6013 5907 9181 11072  
max 117500 75000 102500 50000 117500 50000 50000 47500 25000 37500 75000 117500  
Bushels Sold  
at Spot Market 
             
mean 17385 2557 14905 3874 2672 3664 2252 3931 2405 2214 973 2462  
Standard deviation 26678 6972 19033 8854 6211 7901 5996 8228 5780 5613 3905 11072  
max 117500 40000 102500 50000 32500 50000 30000 47500 25000 37500 25000 117500  
Marketing  
Frequency             
 
mean*** 1.92 0.75 0.91 0.72 0.64 0.60 0.53 0.34 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.20 7.35 
Standard deviation 1.84 0.71 0.86 0.64 0.76 0.58 0.57 0.52 0.44 0.45 0.55 0.49 0.47 
max 9 3 5 3 5 3 2 2 1 2 3 2  
Profit              
mean 1725 -3846 1022 -387 260 1156 2673 1358 510 641 1734 1723 8569 
Standard deviation 10501 3364 6355 3494 4675 3537 4592 4179 2504 2473 5681 7751 9574 
max 30550 7125 30750 10825 31075 12025 25275 23750 9125 15000 46025 82250 30550 
Table 17: Descriptive Statistics of T1 (“Stable” Price Series)* 
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Bushels Sold Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep 
Treatment 
Average 
mean 52729 16260 9962 8359 6260 4771 3607 2882 3340 1698 3187 4447  
Standard deviation 36847 19686 14758 10953 9645 8590 6963 6244 7217 5346 10271 12767  
max 117500 97500 112500 60000 50000 50000 25000 25000 37500 35000 75000 92500  
Bushels Sold  
at Spot Market 
            
 
mean 43550 14523 9084 7195 5668 4332 3263 2519 1355 1641 954 4447  
Standard deviation 36151 18611 14485 10656 9348 8079 6643 5928 5256 5342 5411 12767  
max 117500 97500 112500 60000 50000 50000 25000 25000 37500 35000 50000 92500  
Marketing  
Frequency             
 
mean 2.49 0.89 0.62 0.55 0.44 0.37 0.28 0.23 0.27 0.19 0.21 0.26 6.81 
Standard deviation 1.81 0.94 0.76 0.64 0.58 0.59 0.48 0.44 0.52 0.45 0.53 0.53 0.64 
max 10 5 5 3 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 3  
Profit              
mean 4789 -2314 -2839 -3303 -2468 -2394 -1554 -1801 -944 -881 -2156 -889 -16753 
Standard deviation 9848 4165 2428 3306 2523 3000 2083 2631 1541 1712 6075 2553 30445 
max 23500 9750 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23500 
Table 18:Descriptive Statistics of T2 (Declining Price Series) 
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Bushels Sold Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep 
Treatment 
Average 
mean 66412 15344 10687 7977 6183 4027 2252 1794 1088 687 134 916 
 
Standard deviation 39038 13692 12680 10747 8200 7276 5056 5453 3102 2975 715 3838 
 
max 117500 50000 62500 57500 35000 25000 22500 40000 15000 20000 5000 32500 
 
Bushels Sold  
at Spot Market 
            
 
mean 51927 5191 9427 6240 2366 3989 1050 1374 630 458 115 916 
 
Standard deviation 40929 10454 12678 9371 5610 7284 3946 3888 2526 2477 684 3838 
 
max 117500 50000 62500 42500 25000 25000 22500 20000 15000 20000 5000 32500 
 
Marketing  
Frequency             
 
mean 3.07 0.88 0.68 0.59 0.50 0.32 0.24 0.17 0.15 0.08 0.04 0.11 
6.82 
Standard deviation 1.82 0.73 0.73 0.65 0.55 0.48 0.43 0.41 0.35 0.30 0.19 0.36 
0.83 
max 8 3 3 3 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
 
Profit             
 
mean 14773 8286 5369 3429 6748 5942 4093 3009 1523 673 -50 183 53977 
Standard deviation 14338 9227 8467 6204 9563 11169 9600 9500 4636 3222 262 768 21898 
max 35250 35275 43750 32750 39725 39825 42750 68675 22425 21825 325 6500 107175 
Table 19: Descriptive Statistics of T3 (Erratic Price Series) 
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Bushels Sold Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep 
Treatment 
Average 
mean 44008 26221 16966 10210 6393 5458 2557 2252 1183 992 439 821 
 
Standard deviation 36990 22960 13686 12968 8298 8354 6275 5691 3777 3449 1565 4445 
 
max 117500 107500 60000 92500 25000 40000 40000 35000 27500 25000 7500 42500 
 
Bushels Sold  
at Spot Market 
            
 
mean 19408 6947 14828 4179 1927 3531 1393 2214 706 840 305 821 
 
Standard deviation 27109 15287 14197 10708 5663 7084 5327 5689 3286 3305 1352 4445 
 
max 117500 100000 60000 92500 25000 30000 40000 35000 27500 25000 7500 42500 
 
Marketing  
Frequency             
 
mean 2.19 1.36 0.92 0.70 0.48 0.44 0.22 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.08 
6.97 
Standard deviation 1.79 1.12 0.70 0.70 0.53 0.54 0.43 0.47 0.37 0.32 0.28 0.33 
 
max 9 6 3 4 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 
 
Profit             
 
mean 4461 37937 36489 22351 16158 15290 5122 4261 2460 1491 531 1313 147864 
Standard deviation 10921 36613 31090 29747 21724 23870 13353 11087 8228 5459 2081 7111 66149 
Max 30550 171325 137475 212750 67375 116475 83825 67725 60500 39475 10725 68000 262900 
Table 20: Descriptive Statistics of T4 (Increasing Price Series) 
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Before we move to regression results, we present here a first graphical connection 
between marketing decisions and SF preferences.  We include two graphs for each variable 
of interest.  One associates marketing decisions with the qualitative SF distinction (see 
table 13) and the other associates marketing decisions with the quantitative SF distinction 
(see table 14).  All graphs depict an average of the respective marketing variable pooled 
across price treatments. 
Figure 29: Bushels Sold per month associated with the qualitative specification  
of SF preferences 
 
 
Figure 30: Bushels Sold per month associated with the quantitative specification  
of SF preferences  
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In figure 29 is clear that people who showed strong SF preferences in Stage 1 sold 
more bushels (54,116), right after harvest than Mix (46,875) and NO SF (41,875).  When 
we use the relative weight of SF in figure 30 the difference is small (αSF=49,728, αNo 
SF=50481). 
Figure 31: Bushels sold at spot market per month associated with the qualitative 
specification of SF preferences 
 
 
Figure 32: Bushels sold at spot market per month associated with the  
quantitative specification of SF preferences 
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Regarding the average bushels sold only at the spot market the results are clear 
under both SF preferences specifications.  Figures 31 shows that individuals with SF 
preferences sell more bushels (SF=36,066), at harvest price than individuals with MIX 
(31,285) and NO SF (9,375).  Also, individuals that place a relative weight on SF sold more 
(α SF=34,397) compared to the ones that do not place a value on SF (α NO SF=30,768).  
We also see that NO SF individuals, from October (harvest) through January sold 
remarkably less amount of grain in the spot market than the others. 
 
Figure 33: Marketing frequency per month associated with the  
qualitative specification of SF preferences 
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Figure 34: Marketing frequency per month associated with the  
quantitative specification of SF preferences 
 
 
Marketing Frequency graphs presented in figures 33 and 34 suggest that people 
with SF preferences contract slightly more at the beginning of the marketing year compared 
to others (SF=2.63, MIX=2.24, NO SF=2.12).  Especially in figure 33 it is interesting how 
the behavior of NO SF subjects (and of MIX subject but in smaller extend) changes the last 
months of the year (May and on).  It appears that on average they take the risk of selling 
the amount that they did not sell at the beginning of the year the last four months. 
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Figure 35: Average profit associated with the  
qualitative specification of SF preferences 
 
Figure 36: Average profit associated with the 
quantitative specification of SF preferences 
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on the preferences measure we used.  The qualitative measure suggests that on average SF 
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differences are insignificant.  Nevertheless, to make any conclusions about the impact of 
preferences on profit we need to examine the regression results. 
5.3. Summary of Survey Results 
 
In this part, we provide the summary results of the Survey.  Table 20 lists the results 
regarding subjects’ familiarity with the concept of Expected Value and probability theory.  
Table 21 contains the results of the typical demographic characteristics and Table 22 
presents the results about subjects’ familiarity with farming and grain marketing. 
 
Table 21: Results on familiarity with Probability Theory and Expected Value 
 
 
Table 22: Summary Statistics of Socio-Demographic Characteristics 
Characteristic Subjects 
Percentage of the 
sample 
Males 73 55,7% 
Age 
Average 
21  
 
Min 18 
Max 36 
American Nationality 88 67,1% 
Undergraduate Students 113 86,2% 
NCTA campus 47 35,8% 
Subjects that participated for first time in an 
economic experiment 
95 72,5% 
Subjects that found Instructions Clear 118 90% 
 
Question Subjects 
Percentage of the 
sample 
Subjects that correctly answered the probability 
question 
98 75% 
Subjects that felt familiar with the concept of 
expected value 
59 45% 
Subjects that correctly answered the expected 
value question 
31 24% 
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Table 23: Summary Statistics of Farming Background and Familiarity with Grain 
Marketing 
Question Subjects 
Percentage of the 
sample 
Subjects that have been farmers 48 36.6% 
Subjects that someone in their family is farmer 78 59.5% 
Subjects who were not familiar with grain 
marketing 
29 22.1% 
Subjects who were slightly familiar with grain 
marketing 
34 25,9% 
Subjects who were somewhat familiar with grain 
marketing 
29 22.1% 
Subjects who were moderately familiar with grain 
marketing 
29 22.1% 
Subjects who were extremely familiar with grain 
marketing 
10 0.07% 
 
5.4. Regression Results 
Our primary interest was to econometrically estimate the effect of SF preferences 
on each variable of interest (amount of bushels sold per month, the amount of bushels sold 
at spot market per month and marketing frequency per month in a monthly basis) under the 
four different market conditions.  With 12 marketing periods we had 12 regressions, one 
for each month.  The equations we estimated were constructed as: 
Regression of mth month for bushels sold at spot market, where m ranges from 1 to 
12: 
 𝑺𝒑𝒐𝒕  𝒃𝒖𝒔𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒔𝒊𝒌𝒍 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝑭 + 𝜷𝟐𝑵𝒐 𝑺𝑭 + 𝜷𝒌𝑻𝒌 + 𝜷𝒍 ∑ 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒔
𝒍=𝟒
+ 𝜷𝒏 ∑ 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔
𝒏=𝟏𝟐
+  𝜺 
𝒊𝒌𝒍
 
Where: 
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𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡  𝑏𝑢𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑙 are the bushels sold at spot market from the experimental subject i, 
under kth price treatment and lth price sequence in month m. 
𝛽0 is the overall intercept  
𝛽1 is the effect of SF preferences compared to MIX preferences on bushels sold at spot 
market in month m. 
𝛽2 is the effect of NO SF preferences compared to MIX preferences on bushels sold at 
spot market in month m. 
𝛽k is the effect of price treatment k on the bushels sold at spot market in month m. k 
ranges from 1 to 4. 
𝛽l is the effect of price sequence l on bushels sold at spot market in month m. l ranges 
from 1 to 4. 
𝛽𝑛 is the effect that the control variable n (gender, age, etc.) had on bushels sold at spot 
market in month m. n ranges from 1 to 12  
With two definitions of SF preferences we evaluated each in different regression 
estimates.  One set controlled for SF preferences defined using the qualitative method and 
the other set controlled for SF preferences using the quantitative method.  That is, in the 
one set of regressions we used a categorical variable with three states (SF, MIX, NOSF), 
and in the other set we used a binary dummy (αSF, α NO SF).  Profit was analyzed as 
season ending profit for each price treatment.  The independent variables remained the 
same as before.  Since we have a total of 74 regressions is practically hard to present all of 
them.  Nevertheless, regressions are available in the following link: 
http://rpubs.com/skotsakou2/294122 
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Here we include only the regressions for each dependent variable where the SF 
preferences were significant.   
5.4.1. Regressions for bushels sold per month  
 
a) Qualitative specification of preferences. 
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Table 24: Regressions for bushels sold in October, March, April, May, June, July  
Equation parameter October  March  April 
 
Parameter 
(Std. Error) 
 
Parameter 
(Std. Error) 
 
Parameter 
(Std. Error) 
Constant 
-44,538*** 
(15,496.830) 
 
13,515.260*** 
(3,626.435) 
 
10,359.980*** 
(3,096.403) 
Safety First 
10,568*** 
(3,449.723) 
 
-1,606.702** 
(807.275) 
 
-1,876.347*** 
(689.285) 
No Safety First 
9,080 
(13,218.070) 
 
 
-2,015.854 
(3,093.178) 
 
1,370.024 
(2,641.086) 
UNL campus 
2,850.549 
(4,551.212) 
 
-1,443.675 
(1,065.035) 
 
607.984 
(909.372) 
Male 
1,330.961 
(3,655.020) 
 
-540.123 
(855.316) 
 
340.517 
(730.305) 
Not familiar with grain 
marketing 
11,442.930 
(7,428.408) 
 
48.568 
(1,738.332) 
 
-811.243 
(1,484.261) 
Slightly familiar with 
grain marketing 
10,246.980 
(7,104.250) 
 
891.376 
(1,662.475) 
 
404.347 
(1,419.492) 
Somewhat with grain 
marketing 
15,325.730** 
(7,276.938) 
 
-288.367 
(1,702.886) 
 
-260.944 
(1,453.996) 
Moderately familiar with 
grain marketing 
11,678.010* 
(6,865.054) 
 
535.919 
(1,606.501) 
 
-1,257.200 
(1,371.698) 
Age 
1,454.963** 
(570.383) 
 
-57.453 
(133.476) 
 
4.301 
(113.967) 
Being a farmer 
-2,567.514 
(4,432.448) 
 
1,528.188 
(1,037.243) 
 
-31.657 
(885.642) 
Order 1 
22,984.100*** 
(4,602.569) 
 
-3,817.493*** 
(1,077.054) 
 
-1,267.487 
(919.634) 
Order 2 
11,730.160*** 
(4,506.792) 
 
-2,316.893** 
(1,054.641) 
 
-845.964 
(900.497) 
Order 3 
16,649.220*** 
(4,553.812) 
 
-3,827.228*** 
(1,065.644) 
 
-2,869.990*** 
(909.892) 
Nationality 
7,700.776 
(4,760.519) 
 
-199.178 
(1,114.016) 
 
-1,502.625 
(951.193) 
Question on Expected 
Value 
-1,162.289 
(4,217.590) 
 
-698.988 
(986.964) 
 
-10.721 
(842.712) 
Clear Instructions 
7,348.988 
(5,769.520) 
 
1,629.180 
(1,350.133) 
 
300.862 
(1,152.801) 
First Experiment 
15,440.540*** 
(4,251.641) 
 
-2,119.249** 
(994.932) 
 
-1,291.709 
(849.515) 
Year 2002 
15,858.780*** 
(4,424.919) 
 
-3,587.786*** 
(1,035.482) 
 
-3,797.710*** 
(884.138) 
Year 2003 
29,541.990*** 
(4,424.919) 
 
-4,332.061*** 
(1,035.482) 
 
-5,152.672*** 
(884.138) 
Year 2006 
7,137.405 
(4,424.919) 
 
-2,900.763 
(1,035.482)*** 
 
-4,847.328*** 
(884.138) 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Observations 524` 
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Figure 37: Regressions for bushels sold in May, June, June, July 
Equation parameter  May  June  July 
  
Parameter 
(Std. Error) 
 
Parameter 
(Std. Error) 
 
Parameter 
(Std. Error) 
Constant  
8,189.822*** 
(2,766.900) 
 
6,247.051*** 
(2,266.837) 
 
4,156.408* 
(1,985.623) 
Safety First  
-1,828.948*** 
(615.935) 
 
-1,597.357*** 
(504.617) 
 
-1,286.695*** 
(442.016) 
No Safety First  
-2,872.145 
(2,360.035) 
 
-159.484 
(1,933.505) 
 
330.105 
(1,693.643) 
UNL campus  
1,362.118* 
(812.601) 
 
824.412 
(665.740) 
 
561.176 
(583.151) 
Male  
-470.73 
(652.590) 
 
-564.886 
(534.647) 
 
-121.400 
(468.321) 
Not familiar with 
grain marketing 
 
-366.515 
(1,326.314) 
 
-1,023.874 
(1,086.609) 
 
151.844 
(951.809) 
Slightly familiar with 
grain marketing 
 
1,355.382 
(1,268.437) 
 
-244.064 
(1,039.192) 
 
736.555 
(910.274) 
Somewhat with grain 
marketing 
 
796.015 
(1,299.269) 
 
-477.432 
(1,064.452) 
 
188.214 
(932.401) 
Moderately familiar 
with grain marketing 
 
209.846 
(1,225.729) 
 
-1,138.081 
(1,004.203) 
 
164.790 
(879.626) 
Age  
-9.661 
(101.840) 
 
0.576 
(83.434) 
 
-16.979 
(73.084) 
Being a farmer  
791.256 
(791.396) 
 
1,013.112 
(648.367) 
 
112.977 
(567.933) 
Order 1  
-1,672.660** 
(821.771) 
 
-925.202 
(673.252) 
 
-644.334 
(589.731) 
Order 2  
-1,008.437 
(804.670) 
 
-1,037.754 
(659.242) 
 
-984.501* 
(577.459) 
Order 3  
-2,314.769*** 
(813.066) 
 
-1,035.690 
(666.120) 
 
-870.526 
(583.484) 
Nationality  
-823.597 
(849.972) 
 
-1,499.424** 
(696.357) 
 
-773.494 
(609.970) 
Question on Expected 
Value 
 
-429.365 
(753.035) 
 
-485.569 
(616.938) 
 
-135.547 
(540.404) 
Clear Instructions  
-1,818.997* 
(1,030.126) 
 
-985.431 
(843.951) 
 
-422.314 
(739.254) 
First Experiment  
-1,318.965* 
(759.114) 
 
-694.952 
(843.951) 
 
53.528 
(544.767) 
Year 2002  
-1,412.214* 
(790.052) 
 
629.771 
(647.266) 
 
-916.031 
(566.969) 
Year 2003  
-2,500.000*** 
(790.052) 
 
-1,622.137** 
(647.266) 
 
-1,927.481*** 
(566.969) 
Year 2006  
-2,041.985** 
(790.052) 
 
-1,526.718** 
(647.266) 
 
-1,622.137*** 
(566.969) 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Observations 524` 
 
b) Quantitative specification of preferences 
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Table 25: Bushels Sold in February, June, July (with α parameter) 
Equation parameter February  June  July 
 
Parameter 
(Std. Error) 
 
Parameter 
(Std. Error) 
 
Parameter 
(Std. Error) 
Constant 
19,163.770*** 
(4,557.444) 
 
6,406.987*** 
(2,274.283) 
 
4,407.710** 
(1,987.079) 
α Safety First 
-1,937.368* 
(1,041.629) 
 
-1,048.859** 
(519.800) 
 
-1,045.707** 
(454.158) 
UNL campus 
-196.761 
(1,342.093) 
 
786.448 
(669.739) 
 
550.346 
(585.163) 
Male 
1,175.583 
(1,073.783) 
 
-475.800 
(535.846) 
 
-60.579 
(468.177) 
Not familiar with grain 
marketing 
-2,467.967 
(2,192.041) 
 
-942.715 
(1,093.885) 
 
168.073 
(955.746) 
Slightly familiar with 
grain marketing 
-180.286 
(2,087.375) 
 
-93.863 
(1,041.654) 
 
 
839.158 
(910.111) 
Somewhat with grain 
marketing 
-2,469.281 
(2,149.605) 
 
-311.604 
(1,072.708) 
 
249.699 
(937.243) 
Moderately familiar with 
grain marketing 
1,169.065 
(2,002.921) 
 
-806.015 
(999.510) 
 
422.085 
(873.288) 
Age 
-83.340 
(167.355) 
 
-7.738 
(83.514) 
 
-21.759 
(72.968) 
Being a farmer 
-966.307 
(1,298.178) 
 
849.711 
(647.825) 
 
-3.336 
(566.015) 
Order 1 
-4,208.308*** 
(1,354.693) 
 
-1,051.038 
(676.027) 
 
-774.203 
(590.656) 
Order 2 
-1,521.611 
(1,331.452) 
 
-1,119.254* 
(664.429) 
 
-1,069.073* 
(580.523) 
Order 3 
-1,644.719 
(1,341.524) 
 
-1,147.121* 
(669.455) 
 
-984.390* 
(584.915) 
Nationality 
-2,184.187 
(1,399.174) 
 
-1,318.761* 
(698.224) 
 
-677.209 
(610.050) 
Question on Expected 
Value 
-1,514.691 
(1,241.951) 
 
-509.500 
(619.766) 
 
-148.393 
(541.500) 
Clear Instructions 
-1,623.666 
(1,689.127) 
 
-1,163.083 
(842.918) 
 
-531.151 
(736.472) 
First Experiment 
-1,715.580 
(1,249.069) 
 
-668.217 
(623.318) 
 
68.051 
(544.603) 
Year 2002 
-3,606.870*** 
(1,303.422) 
 
629.771 
(650.441) 
 
-916.031 
(568.302) 
Year 2003 
-3,683.206*** 
(1,303.422) 
 
-1,622.137** 
(650.441) 
 
-1,927.481*** 
(568.302) 
Year 2006 
-3,473.282*** 
(1,303.422) 
 
-1,526.718** 
(650.441) 
 
-1,622.137*** 
(568.302) 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Τhe regression results for the amount of bushels sold by individuals per month 
suggest that the existence of SF preferences had an impact on their decisions.  More 
specifically, the regressions estimated with the quantitative measure of preferences show 
that individuals with strong SF preferences sell significantly more grain right after harvest 
(October).  Furthermore, subjects with strong SF preferences leave significantly less 
amount to be sold the second half of the year (March-April and on).  Regressions estimated 
based on the relative weight α of SF preferences do not verify that there was a significant 
impact of SF preferences for the bushels sold on October.  Nevertheless, the estimates for 
June, and July lead to the same conclusion as the estimates for June and July with the 
quantitative measure.  Additionally, the different price treatments also affected 
participants’ decisions on the amount of grain that they sold monthly.  Also, even though 
we controlled for order effects, the order that the treatments were presented to subjects 
played a significant role on how they allocated their grain during the marketing year.  
 
 
 
5.4.2. Regressions for bushels sold at spot market per month  
 
a) Qualitative specification of preferences 
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Table 26: Bushels Sold at Spot Market in October, March, April  
Equation parameter October  March  April 
 
Parameter 
(Std. Error) 
 
Parameter 
(Std. Error) 
 
Parameter 
(Std. Error) 
Constant 
-24,707.000* 
(14,041.590) 
 
-7,965.015** 
(3,219.418) 
 
 
3,688.175 
(2,386.513) 
Safety First 
7,243.581** 
(3,125.775) 
 
1,478.018** 
(716.669) 
 
-999.702* 
(531.257) 
No Safety First 
-14,007.500 
(11,976.820) 
 
-3,722.749 
(2,746.012) 
 
-1,522.859 
(2,035.582) 
UNL campus 
987.778 
(4,123.828) 
 
-753.349 
(945.500) 
 
993.444 
(700.887) 
Male 
3,444.260 
(3,311.793) 
 
-1,247.043 
(759.319) 
 
-1,192.795** 
(562.873) 
Not familiar with grain 
marketing 
4,553.825 
(6,730.839) 
 
1,566.368 
(1,543.228) 
 
-1,103.898 
(1,143.975) 
Slightly familiar with 
grain marketing 
4,157.150 
(6,437.122) 
 
2,969.415** 
(1,475.886) 
 
742.939 
(1,094.055) 
Somewhat with grain 
marketing 
9,866.604 
(6,593.594) 
 
1,237.269 
(1,511.761) 
 
-47.252 
(1,120.649) 
Moderately familiar with 
grain marketing 
7,244.573 
(6,220.388) 
 
2,647.639* 
(1,426.193) 
 
-132.195 
(1,057.218) 
Age 
799.972 
(516.821) 
 
-93.031 
(118.495) 
 
18.624 
(87.839) 
Being a farmer 
-5,594.248 
(4,016.216) 
 
1,052.181 
(920.827) 
 
141.418 
(682.597) 
Order 1 
14,680.250*** 
(4,170.362) 
 
-2,181.941** 
(956.169) 
 
-256.582 
(708.796) 
Order 2 
11,636.000*** 
(4,083.580) 
 
-802.115 
(936.272) 
 
40.418 
(694.046) 
Order 3 
15,810.260*** 
(4,126.184) 
 
-2,089.825** 
(946.040) 
 
-1,083.010 
(701.287) 
Nationality 
3,034.863 
(4,313.480) 
 
93.591 
(988.983) 
 
96.893 
(733.120) 
Question on Expected 
Value 
-3,798.268 
(3,821.535) 
 
122.174 
(876.191) 
 
-429.753 
(649.509) 
Clear Instructions 
3,426.568 
(5,227.730) 
 
427.400 
(1,198.600) 
 
-131.984 
(888.506) 
First Experiment 
2,652.059 
(3,852.388) 
 
-2,693.855*** 
(883.265) 
 
-995.898 
(654.753) 
Year 2002 
26,164.120*** 
(4,009.395) 
 
667.939 
(919.263) 
 
1,011.450 
(681.438) 
Year 2003 
34,541.990*** 
(4,009.395) 
 
324.427 
(919.263) 
 
-1,202.290* 
(681.438) 
Year 2006 
2,022.901 
(4,009.395) 
 
-133.588 
(919.263) 
 
858.779 
(681.438) 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Observations 524 
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Figure 38: Bushels Sold at Spot Market in May, June, July 
Equation parameter May  June  July 
 
Parameter 
(Std. Error) 
 
Parameter 
(Std. Error) 
 
Parameter 
(Std. Error) 
Constant 
7,733.403*** 
(2,598.252) 
 
5,298.885*** 
(1,880.054) 
 
3,905.638** 
(1,901.782) 
Safety First 
-1,782.277*** 
(578.392) 
 
-1,241.559*** 
(418.516) 
 
-1,262.690*** 
(423.352) 
No Safety First 
-2,741.492 
(2,216.186) 
 
-2,147.876 
(1,603.597) 
 
-916.112 
(1,622.130) 
UNL campus 
1,254.366 
(763.072) 
 
1,538.941*** 
(552.147) 
 
696.729 
(558.528) 
Male 
-587.948 
(612.813) 
 
-846.829* 
(443.422) 
 
-91.526 
(448.546) 
Not familiar with grain 
marketing 
-927.121 
(1,245.472) 
 
-375.989 
(901.204) 
 
-283.583 
(911.619) 
Slightly familiar with grain 
marketing 
930.685 
(1,191.123) 
 
852.644 
(861.878) 
 
537.523 
(871.838) 
Somewhat with grain 
marketing 
-20.228 
(1,220.076) 
 
149.541 
(882.828) 
 
-53.929 
(893.031) 
Moderately familiar with grain 
marketing 
129.851 
(1,151.018) 
 
-16.143 
(832.859) 
 
138.362 
(842.484) 
Age 
-0.651 
(95.632) 
 
-57.048 
(69.198) 
 
-32.305 
(69.998) 
Being a farmer 
486.414 
(743.159) 
 
1,063.021** 
(537.738) 
 
249.679 
(543.953) 
Order 1 
-1,706.263** 
(771.682) 
 
-674.846 
(558.377) 
 
-311.512 
(564.830) 
Order 2 
-822.199 
(755.624) 
 
-637.441 
(546.758) 
 
-661.141 
(553.077) 
Order 3 
-2,435.002*** 
(763.508) 
 
-328.494 
(552.462) 
 
-796.458 
(558.847) 
Nationality 
-931.732 
(798.165) 
 
-1,107.706* 
(577.539) 
 
-518.909 
(584.214) 
Question on Expected Value 
4.244 
(707.136) 
 
-18.496 
(511.672) 
 
2.468 
(517.586) 
Clear Instructions 
-1,187.082 
(967.337) 
 
-1,106.757 
(699.950) 
 
-263.157 
(708.039) 
First Experiment 
1,450.845** 
(712.845) 
 
-505.729 
(515.803) 
 
-224.720 
(521.764) 
Year 2002 
-1,412.214* 
(741.897) 
 
-1,049.618* 
(536.825) 
 
-572.519 
(543.029) 
Year 2003 
-2,557.252*** 
(741.897) 
 
-1,774.809*** 
(536.825) 
 
-1,755.725*** 
(543.029) 
Year 2006 
-1,717.557** 
(741.897) 
 
-1,698.473*** 
(536.825) 
 
-1,374.046** 
(543.029) 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Observations 524 
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b) Quantitative specification of preferences 
Table 27: Bushels Sold at Spot Market in October, December, February, (with α 
parameter)  
Equation parameter October  December  February 
 
Parameter 
(Std. Error) 
 
Parameter 
(Std. Error) 
 
Parameter 
(Std. Error) 
Constant 
-27,772.060** 
(14,044.540) 
 
26,061.050*** 
(6,498.660) 
 
6,859.977** 
(2,913.934) 
α Safety First 
6,780.251** 
(3,209.959) 
 
3,935.412*** 
(1,485.305) 
 
-2,281.307*** 
(665.996) 
UNL campus 
1,105.657 
(4,135.889) 
 
-434.012 
(1,913.750) 
 
843.488 
(858.106) 
Male 
3,216.516 
(3,309.046) 
 
-3,713.620** 
(1,531.154) 
 
-756.628 
(686.554) 
Not familiar with grain 
marketing 
4,705.664 
(6,755.149) 
 
-5,811.980* 
(3,125.728) 
 
426.717 
(1,401.545) 
Slightly familiar with grain 
marketing 
3,382.786 
(6,432.603) 
 
-6,381.869** 
(2,976.480) 
 
2,317.056* 
(1,334.624) 
Somewhat with grain 
marketing 
9,777.305 
(6,624.373) 
 
-7,581.630** 
(3,065.216) 
 
757.494 
(1,374.412) 
Moderately familiar with 
grain marketing 
5,542.537 
(6,172.344) 
 
-5,025.399* 
(2,856.054) 
 
1,475.316 
(1,280.626) 
Age 
868.994* 
(515.733) 
 
-171.578 
(238.639) 
 
-87.480 
(107.003) 
Being a farmer 
-5,141.004 
(4,000.558) 
 
-854.674 
(1,851.130) 
 
765.587 
(830.028) 
Order 1 
15,799.270*** 
(4,174.717) 
 
-1,490.940 
(1,931.716) 
 
-1,742.336** 
(866.162) 
Order 2 
12,174.510*** 
(4,103.095) 
 
75.404 
(1,898.575) 
 
33.403 
(851.302) 
Order 3 
16,754.360*** 
(4,134.137) 
 
-3,049.390 
(1,912.939) 
 
-920.680 
(857.743) 
Nationality 
2,322.683 
(4,311.793) 
 
-168.988 
(1,995.143) 
 
-501.454 
(894.602) 
Question on Expected Value 
-3,633.665 
(3,827.284) 
 
1,227.311 
(1,770.953) 
 
-1,027.615 
(794.078) 
Clear Instructions 
3,616.092 
(5,205.332) 
 
1,160.535 
(2,408.600) 
 
-493.224 
(1,079.992) 
First Experiment 
2,843.337 
(3,849.220) 
 
-2,515.520 
(1,781.103) 
 
-1,307.363 
(798.629) 
Year 2002 
26,164.120*** 
(4,016.717) 
 
-5,820.611*** 
(1,858.607) 
 
2,996.183*** 
(833.381) 
Year 2003 
34,541.990*** 
(4,016.717) 
 
-5,477.099*** 
(1,858.607) 
 
-305.344 
(833.381) 
Year 2006 
2,022.901 
(4,016.717) 
 
-76.336 
(1,858.607) 
 
-744.275 
(833.381) 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Observations 524 
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The regression results with the quantitative distinction of SF preferences for the 
bushels sold at spot market per month suggest something interesting.  Subjects who exhibit 
strong SF preferences sell significantly more amount of grain in the cash price offered at 
harvest.  That is, they are willing to give up the opportunity of a better price even in the 
near future, as well as they do not place value on carry opportunities that the market offers 
through futures contracts.  Additionally, for the last six months of the year subjects with 
strong SF preferences sell significantly less amount of grain at the spot market.  The 
regression results of the quantitative analysis verify the fact that subjects who place value 
on SF prefer to sell more grain on harvest price, and hence remove the price risk for a 
greater proportion of their grain. 
It is worth noting that the regressions where participants have been distinguished 
based on the α parameter have a positive coefficient on SF preferences until December 
compared to the regressions with the qualitative measure of SF preferences where the 
coefficient of SF switches from positive to negative in November.  This is not surprising if 
we recall the way that subjects have been pooled in the quantitative specification of SF 
preferences.  Any value of parameter α greater than zero classifies the subject as SF and 
any value of parameter α equal to zero classifies the subject as NO SF.  Therefore, SF 
category includes both subjects that place low and high value on SF.  Hence, the subjects 
that place low value on SF they sell early in the year (first half of the year) but apparently 
later than the ones that place high value on SF (first month of the year).  Pooling these 
subjects in the same group results in getting a positive instead of negative coefficient on 
SF preferences until December. 
5.4.3. Regressions for marketing frequency per month  
 Qualitative specification of preferences 
100 
 
Table 28: Marketing Frequency in October, December, January, February 
Equation parameter October  December  January  February 
 
Parameter 
(Std. 
Error) 
 
Parameter 
(Std. 
Error) 
 
Parameter 
(Std. 
Error) 
 
Parameter 
(Std. 
Error) 
Constant 
-1.665** 
(0.751) 
 
1.778*** 
(0.326) 
 
1.509*** 
(0.275) 
 
1.086*** 
(0.258) 
Safety First 
0.540*** 
(0.167) 
 
-0.127* 
(0.073) 
 
-0.120* 
(0.061) 
 
-0.117** 
(0.058) 
No Safety First 
0.448 
(0.641) 
 
-0.453 
(0.278) 
 
0.067 
(0.235) 
 
-0.190 
(0.220) 
UNL campus 
0.331 
(0.221) 
 
0.067 
(0.096) 
 
0.094 
(0.081) 
 
0.087 
(0.076) 
Male 
-0.153 
(0.177) 
 
-0.122 
(0.077) 
 
0.068 
(0.065) 
 
0.107* 
(0.061) 
Not familiar with grain marketing 
0.480 
(0.360) 
 
-0.104 
(0.156) 
 
0.208 
(0.132) 
 
-0.012 
(0.124) 
Slightly familiar with grain 
marketing 
0.571* 
(0.344) 
 
-0.155 
(0.150) 
 
0.150 
(0.126) 
 
0.057 
(0.118) 
Somewhat with grain marketing 
0.789** 
(0.353) 
 
-0.384** 
(0.153) 
 
0.024 
(0.129) 
 
-0.106 
(0.121) 
Moderately familiar with grain 
marketing 
0.397 
(0.333) 
 
-0.172 
(0.144) 
 
0.094 
(0.122) 
 
0.103 
(0.114) 
Age 
0.056** 
(0.028) 
 
-0.023* 
(0.012) 
 
-0.030*** 
(0.010) 
 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
Being a farmer 
-0.075 
(0.215) 
 
0.051 
(0.093) 
 
0.018 
(0.079) 
 
-0.086 
(0.074) 
Order 1 
0.927*** 
(0.223) 
 
-0.094 
(0.097) 
 
-0.311*** 
(0.082) 
 
-0.245*** 
(0.077) 
Order 2 
0.293 
(0.218) 
 
-0.059 
(0.095) 
 
-0.282*** 
(0.080) 
 
-0.085 
(0.075) 
Order 3 
0.444** 
(0.221) 
 
-0.088 
(0.096) 
 
-0.260*** 
(0.081) 
 
-0.142* 
(0.076) 
Nationality 
0.396* 
(0.231) 
 
-0.078 
(0.100) 
 
-0.095 
(0.085) 
 -0.226*** 
Question on Expected Value 
-0.183 
(0.204) 
 
0.008 
(0.089) 
 
-0.034 
(0.075) 
 
-0.056 
(0.070) 
Clear Instructions 
0.501* 
(0.280) 
 
-0.002 
(0.121) 
 
-0.084 
(0.103) 
 
-0.031 
(0.096) 
First Experiment 
0.795*** 
(0.206) 
 
-0.064 
(0.089) 
 
0.001 
(0.076) 
 
-0.059 
(0.071) 
Year 2002 
0.573*** 
(0.214) 
 
-0.290*** 
(0.093) 
 
-0.168** 
(0.079) 
 
-0.198*** 
(0.074) 
Year 2003 
1.153*** 
(0.214) 
 
-0.229** 
(0.093) 
 
-0.130* 
(0.079) 
 
-0.137* 
(0.074) 
Year 2006 
0.275 
(0.214) 
 
0.015 
(0.093) 
 
-0.015 
(0.079) 
 
-0.160** 
(0.074) 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Observations 524 
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Table 29: Marketing Frequency in March, April, May, June, July 
Equation parameter March  April  May  June  July 
 
Parameter 
(Std. 
Error) 
 
Parameter 
(Std. 
Error) 
 
Parameter 
(Std. 
Error) 
 
Parameter 
(Std. 
Error) 
 
Parameter 
(Std. 
Error) 
Constant 
1.193*** 
(0.229) 
 
0.857*** 
(0.206) 
 
0.758*** 
(0.194) 
 
0.559*** 
(0.180) 
 
0.311* 
(0.165) 
Safety First 
-0.162*** 
(0.051) 
 
-0.095** 
(0.046) 
 
-0.145*** 
(0.043) 
 
-0.170*** 
(0.040) 
 
-0.125*** 
(0.037) 
No Safety First 
-0.196 
(0.195) 
 
-0.083 
(0.175) 
 
-0.308* 
(0.166) 
 
0.066 
(0.154) 
 
0.009 
(0.141) 
UNL campus 
0.0003 
(0.067) 
 
0.091 
(0.060) 
 
0.083 
(0.057) 
 
0.112** 
(0.053) 
 
0.090* 
(0.049) 
Male 
-0.060 
(0.054) 
 
0.004 
(0.048) 
 
-0.017 
(0.046) 
 
-0.009 
(0.043) 
 
-0.031 
(0.039) 
Not familiar with grain 
marketing 
-0.055 
(0.110) 
 
-0.019 
(0.099) 
 
0.083 
(0.093) 
 
0.054 
(0.086) 
 
0.083 
(0.079) 
Slightly familiar with grain 
marketing 
-0.019 
(0.105) 
 
0.088 
(0.094) 
 
0.216** 
(0.089) 
 
0.089 
(0.083) 
 
0.107 
(0.076) 
Somewhat with grain 
marketing 
-0.143 
(0.108) 
 
0.011 
(0.097) 
 
0.103 
(0.091)) 
 
0.001 
(0.085) 
 
0.019 
(0.078) 
Moderately familiar with 
grain marketing 
-0.028 
(0.101) 
 
-0.015 
(0.091) 
 
0.085 
(0.086) 
 
-0.027 
(0.080) 
 
0.018 
(0.073) 
Age 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
Being a farmer 
0.113* 
(0.066) 
 
-0.002 
(0.059) 
 
0.055 
(0.056) 
 
0.081 
(0.052) 
 
0.044 
(0.047) 
Order 1 
-0.215*** 
(0.068) 
 
-0.104* 
(0.061) 
 
-0.136** 
(0.058) 
 
-0.079 
(0.054) 
 
-0.083* 
(0.049) 
Order 2 
-0.189*** 
(0.067) 
 
-0.081 
(0.060) 
 
-0.113** 
(0.056) 
 
-0.097* 
(0.052) 
 
-0.099** 
(0.048) 
Order 3 
-0.257*** 
(0.067) 
 
-0.235*** 
(0.060) 
 
-0.189*** 
(0.057) 
 
-0.110** 
(0.053) 
 
order3 
-0.094* 
Nationality 
-0.095 
(0.070) 
 
-0.123* 
(0.063) 
 
-0.066 
(0.060) 
 
-0.102* 
(0.055) 
 
-0.063 
(0.051) 
Question on Expected 
Value 
-0.090 
(0.062) 
 
-0.028 
(0.056) 
 
-0.010 
(0.053) 
 
-0.043 
(0.049) 
 
-0.044 
(0.045) 
Clear Instructions 
0.059 
(0.085) 
 
0.034 
(0.077) 
 
-0.066 
(0.072) 
 
-0.074 
(0.067) 
 
0.010 
(0.062) 
First Experiment 
-0.147** 
(0.063) 
 
-0.097* 
(0.056) 
 
-0.128** 
(0.053) 
 
-0.045 
(0.049) 
 
-0.001 
(0.045) 
Year 2002 
-0.221*** 
(0.065) 
 
-0.244*** 
(0.059) 
 
-0.115** 
(0.055) 
 
0.015 
(0.051) 
 
-0.053 
(0.047) 
Year 2003 
-0.275*** 
(0.065) 
 
-0.290*** 
(0.059) 
 
-0.176*** 
(0.055) 
 
-0.107** 
(0.051) 
 
-0.160*** 
(0.047) 
Year 2006 
-0.153** 
(0.065) 
 
-0.305*** 
(0.059) 
 
-0.122** 
(0.055) 
 
-0.107** 
(0.051) 
 
-0.130*** 
(0.047) 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Observations 524 
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The regressions of Marketing Frequency where preferences were categorized based 
on the relative weight of SF did not yield any significant estimates on SF preferences, 
although they had the appropriate sign.  Also, SF preferences were not significant for 
profits in any regression.  The regressions on marketing frequency with the qualitative 
specification of preferences (SF, MIX, NO SF) are consistent with the remaining analysis.  
Participants with strong SF preferences show significantly higher marketing frequency 
right after harvest compared to participants with low SF preferences. 
The absence of significance for profit reveals an interesting conclusion.  Recall that 
the dependent variable for profit regressions was the profit per game (not per month) for 
each individual for all price treatments.  Therefore, keeping everything else constant, 
preferences did not appear to be a significant determinant of the profit in the long-run.  The 
different price fluctuations from price treatment to price treatment offset any differences 
in profit.  Since our price treatments are actual market prices happened in different 
marketing years in the past, our result is an evidence that even though grain marketing 
decisions are affected by individuals’ SF preferences, in the long run the monetary outcome 
may remain unaffected. 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
In this study, we investigated whether Safety First (SF) preferences influence grain 
marketing decisions.  We ran a context rich economic experiment that involved 3 stages.  
In stage 1 we elicited SF preferences with a method proposed by Levy and Levy (2009).  
In Stage 2 we recorded participants’ grain marketing decisions on a grain marketing 
simulation game.  Finally, in Stage 3 we surveyed participants about their 
sociodemographic characteristics. 
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Our results were found to be similar to those found by Levy and Levy (2009), that 
SF matters in decision making.  Going to the grain marketing, we found that SF preferences 
influence the amount of bushels sold through forward contracts, the amount of bushels sold 
at spot market as well as the marketing frequency.  Specifically, individuals who showed 
strong SF preferences sold significantly more grain at the beginning of the marketing year 
compared to individuals with low SF preferences.  However, the presence of SF 
preferences was not a significant determinant of the profit.  This finding leads us to the 
conclusion that different market fluctuations from year to year offset any difference in 
profit regardless individuals’ risk preferences.  That is, a certain segment of producers, 
those with SF preferences, will sell at harvest regardless of price expectations.  Sometimes 
they win and sometimes they lose but there is no difference in their profit over time when 
it is compared with people with different SF preferences.  Results from this study provide 
evidence that it may not be optimal to consider that all producers follow the same marketing 
strategies.  Finally, the use of the grain marketing simulation game and in general the 
experimental approach of grain marketing decisions allowed us to observe decisions that 
are unobservable in real world.  Our findings suggest that simulation games and context 
rich experiments can be a powerful tool solving important limitations such as lack of 
necessary data and reducing the divergence between theoretical and empirical findings. 
Future Work  
Our results indicated that MINE game serves as an efficient data source for grain 
marketing decisions.  Therefore, it would be interesting to repeat the same experiment in 
the field.  This way we will have an opportunity to work with producers and hence, to 
increase the complexity of the environment by adding more types of contracts. 
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Also, it is essential to repeat the study for pre-harvest marketing and observe the 
differences in behavior when yield risk is present.  More specifically, an experiment that 
allows for both pre- and post-harvest decisions with producers as subjects would be an 
ideal set up to examine in depth marketing decisions.  In addition, in this study costs and 
yield were the same for all subjects.  It would be interesting to examine the differences in 
economies of scale by varying the numbers of the yield and the cost.  Finally, in this study 
grain marketing decisions are perceived as individual decisions.  However, producers are 
influenced from their family as well as from their peers (other farmers etc.).  Therefore, it 
appears it would be useful to evaluate the role of social interactions on producers’ 
marketing decisions. 
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Appendix II: Socio-Demographic Survey 
 
Please provide an answer to the following general knowledge questions: 
3.1.1. There are 5 marbles in a bag: 4 are blue, and 1 is red. What is the probability that a blue marble gets 
picked? 
 
 
 
3.1.2. Are you familiar with the concept of expected value? Please circle an answer: 
 
Yes 
No 
 
 
3.1.3. What is the expected value for the following gamble? You can receive $10 with a probability of  
         1/3 and $20 with a probability of 2/3. Write down the answer in the space provided below. 
 
  
------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Please provide an answer in the following questions about the experiment: 
 
3.2.1. Is this the first economic experiment in which you have participated? Please circle an answer: 
Yes  
No 
If No, approximately how many other experiments have you been in?           
………………………………….. 
 
3.2.2. Were the instructions for this experiment clear? Please circle an answer: 
Yes 
No 
If No, what part was not clear? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………… 
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3.2.3. Do you have any comments about the experiment? For example, you can comment on (i) what 
features of the experiment were driving your choices, (ii) your experience from today’s experiment and any 
improvements that you think that are necessary.   Please write them down in the space provided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please provide an answer to the following demographic questions: 
3.3.1. What year are you in school? 
Freshman 
Sophomore 
Junior 
Senior 
Other 
If other, please specify: 
 
3.3.2. Where do you study?  
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Nebraska College of Technical Agriculture in Curtis 
 
What is your intended or declared major? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………. 
 
3.3.3. Age:_________ 
 
3.3.4. Sex: 
  Male 
  Female  
  Don’t wish to disclose 
 
3.3.5. Nationality:   U.S.A./ NOT U.S.A. 
3.3.6. Are you part of any club or team?  
Yes 
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No 
Other 
If other, please provide a brief explanation: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………… 
    
3.3.7. Have you ever been a farmer?   Please circle the right answer:   
Yes 
No 
Other 
If other, please provide a brief explanation: 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………… 
3.3.8. Is someone in your family a farmer?  
Yes  
No 
Other 
If other, please provide a brief explanation: 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………… 
3.3.9. How familiar are you with commodity prices and commodity trading issues 
 
1)  Not at all familiar  
2)  Slightly familiar  
3)  Somewhat familiar  
4)  Moderately familiar  
5)  Extremely familiar  
 
 
 
